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Introduction

The renewable electricity sector is one of the most promising markets in terms of longterm sustainability, energy security, and environmental responsibility. Renewable energy
technologies, such as photovoltaic solar panels and wind turbines, have opened the door to an
almost inexhaustible source of natural energy. As fossil fuels become scarcer, it is imperative
that countries begin to develop new ways to harness these sources of energy and improve
efficiency of their everyday processes. In addition to its inexhaustibility, harvesting energy from
renewable sources has far fewer negative impacts on the environment than conventional energy
production. The health and productivity costs associated with global climate change are
significant, causing many countries around the world to enact stricter environmental regulations
and set dramatic emissions reduction goals for the near future. Renewable energy offers a
solution for all these challenges and production must be encouraged in significant, but
responsible ways.
Unfortunately, renewable energy production currently represents a very small fraction of
our total energy production. According to the International Energy Agency, the world relies on
renewable energy sources for just 13.1% of its energy supply. Although this number is a result of
significant increases over the past decade or so, it is still a far cry from the production necessary
to reverse global climate change and ensure future energy security. To make matters worse,
forecasts for future energy demand allude to increases across all consumption types, from
residential to commercial and industrial. Although new sources of fuel have been found using
methods such as hydraulic fracturing, the extraction of these fuels is extremely damaging to the
environment and is, of course, still finite.
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The greatest barrier associated with the proliferation of renewable energy is its cost. Like

most new technologies, the technology associated with renewable electricity faces very high
research and development costs. This results in much higher initial construction costs for
renewable energy installations, causing consumers to shy away despite the production cost per
kilowatt hour being relatively low over the course of longer time horizons. In comparison,
conventional energy technology has long benefited from economies of scale, leading to very low
initial costs and well-established infrastructure. With customers intimidated by high costs,
renewable energy technology is not receiving the capital necessary to speed up development and
proliferation rates. This is a major issue that some countries have begun to address through
intervention in the market.
The challenge of high technological costs is compounded by a variety of market failures
within the energy industry, as well as by stubborn social norms that downplay the gravity of
environmental issues. The most significant market failure is the unaccounted cost of negative
externalities caused by conventional energy production. A recent study conducted by the
National Research Council concluded that the production of electricity using fossil fuels causes
upwards of $63 billion dollars in environmental and health damages per year (NRC, 2010). This
figure represents approximately $.036 in damages per kilowatt hour, a figure that, if internalized,
would increase current electricity rates by 40-50%. Other market failures include unaccounted
for national security expenditures, asymmetric information, and unregulated market power of
leading firms, each of which involve a negative externality that, if internalized, would increase
the price of conventional electricity by even more.
Although more and more people are starting to believe in global climate change and its
various causes and effects, many are still skeptical about the effectiveness of available
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technology. This skepticism is reflected in consumer preferences, which take the form of low
adoption rates in the renewable energy sector. Despite some consumers expressing a willingness
to pay a premium for environmentally-friendly products, including renewable electricity, other
factors such as perceived inconvenience and unreliability severely hinder actual implementation.
The most significant cause of these psychological biases is the lack of appropriate information,
both on climate change and its possible solutions. To be fair, climate change is an extremely
complex process that has yet to be fully understood, even by the experts. Therefore, it is even
more important that information is consumer-friendly and relevant to the major concerns of those
that remain unconvinced.
There is no doubt that renewable electricity will need to play a major role in our future
energy production, therefore it is imperative to encourage its growth and development now.
Many countries around the world, and a few states here in the US, have already enacted policies
to encourage the proliferation of renewable electricity. The most popular policies have been
based on traditional subsidy mechanisms, in which the developing technological sector is
protected from the competitive nature of existing substitute products. This protection incentivizes
entry into the sector, accelerating development and increasing competition.
A subsidy can be financed several different ways, each having a different effect on the
greater market. One subsidy in particular, called a feed-in tariff, has been implemented with
some success in Europe and the United States, as evidenced by increases in renewable electricity
capacity without major market implications. A feed-in tariff is a subsidy that is financed by the
existing firms in a sector, in this case conventional energy utilities. These utilities are mandated
to increase their renewable generation capacities by entering into contracts with independent,
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renewable electricity generators. These contracts stipulate the long-term purchase of renewable
electricity at a price determined by a variety of different market factors.
Instead of targeting the initial construction costs of renewable electricity systems like
some energy programs do, feed-in tariffs target the long run costs of producing renewable
electricity. This improves stability in the renewable electricity market as well as increases the
chance of turning a profit in the long run, which subsequently encourages investment in the
sector. The feed-in tariff is decreased over the length of the contract to parallel the decreasing
costs in technology, and to encourage honest development towards cheaper and more efficient
products. Ideally, feed-in tariffs will phase out as the once-new technology can compete on its
own with traditional technology.
This paper will examine the theoretical framework of a feed-in tariff before analyzing the
political and economic characteristics of existing feed-in tariff systems adopted here in
California and in Germany. Along with a set of policy criteria, proper analysis of existing market
failures, barriers, and behavioral factors will be provided with concern to the proliferation of
renewable resources. The goal of this paper is to provide policymakers with the information
necessary in devising new incentive programs and to improve existing policies, specifically the
feed-in tariff system. I will finally provide my own policy recommendations based on the criteria
and analyses described above.
The structure of this paper will be as follows. Chapter 1 will describe, in detail, the past
and current energy production and consumption landscapes in the state of California. This
chapter will also address forecasts for future consumption before outlining the major efficiency
and environmental goals outlined in California policy. Chapter 2 will delve into the current status
of renewable energy technology with respect to its environmental advantages and economic
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challenges. This section will also examine some of the existing social norms and psychological
biases surrounding environmentalism and the adoption of green technology. Chapter 3 will set up
the necessary, theoretical framework for a renewable energy incentive program, specifically
addressing the policy challenges and market effects of subsidies and feed-in tariffs. Chapter 4
will then analyze existing feed-in tariff policies in California and Germany, comparing the
effectiveness of each from a cost and capacity perspective using a set of established criteria.
Lastly, Chapter 5 will consist of my analysis and policy recommendations for improving the
feed-in tariff system here in California. These recommendations will hopefully have applicability
outside of California for states looking to adopt or improve their own renewable energy policies.
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Chapter 1: California’s Electricity Landscape

California’s electricity production over the last half century has experienced a variety of
trends in both supply and demand. These trends, including changes in state population, consumer
preferences, technology, and natural resource markets, have affected pricing and consumption in
dynamic ways. Consequently, these changes have had dramatic effects on the local and regional
climate and environmental quality, spurring the need for comprehensive policy changes. It is
important to analyze energy production and the environment together, as their relationship is
strongly intertwined and will become even more so in the coming decades as the United States
transitions to renewable energy.

I. Electricity Production and Consumption: Past and Present
California, like the rest of the nation and world, has produced the majority of its
electricity using conventional technology and fossil fuels. Currently, natural gas fired plants
account for 57.1% of all energy produced, followed by hydroelectric1 and nuclear at 17.5% and
9.2%, respectively. Electricity produced from coal-fired plants is relatively low, accounting for a
mere .8%. By comparison, coal-based power plants account for over 44% of the United States’
electricity production, while natural gas accounts for just 23% (Long, 2011). Although California
has done well to limit the use of coal by using somewhat cleaner burning natural gas, both will
have to be reduced and eventually replaced by renewable sources in order to achieve portfolio
goals.
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The environmental impacts of hydroelectric facilities have yet to be fully understood. However, early studies show that land displacement
caused by dams and reservoirs may cause significant greenhouse gas emissions due to the decay of submerged trees and other plants (Castaldi et
al, 2003). Regardless, the focus of this paper is on prevailing renewable technologies surrounding wind and sunlight.
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California’s electricity production ranks high within the United States in several

categories. California ranks first in both net generation from renewable sources and geothermal
generation. California also ranks high in the nation for conventional hydroelectric, placing third.
Lastly, the state ranks tenth in the nation for electricity generation from nuclear plants (SmutnyJones, 2007). This diverse portfolio of production sources has served its consumers well,
providing reliable power even during peak demand. However, emissions from the electricity
sector account for nearly 25% of California’s greenhouse gas emissions, amounting to over three
metric tons of greenhouse gas per person per year in California. Although steps are being taken
to account for these emissions, power plants and utility companies have yet to truly internalize
all of the costs.
From a growth standpoint, California’s energy production has been on the upswing for
many decades. According to the California Energy Commission, electricity production is up 67%
since 1980, when production was approximately 170,000 GWh. Over the same period,
California’s population has increased by only 59%, revealing a slight increase in per capita
electricity production. Electricity generated from wind has experienced a growth rate of 178%
over the last 15 years, leading all categories. Solar has seen similar success, growing by 30%
over the same period. That being said, electricity generated from coal and natural gas has also
experienced relatively large growth at 37% and 22%, respectively (CEC Online Database, 2012).
Although growth in the renewable energy sectors looks impressive, electricity from these sources
still represents a drop in the ocean compared to fossil fuel based generation.
California is able to produce enough energy to meet approximately 70% of total demand;
the remaining 30% must be imported from neighboring states to the North and East. This
represents a fairly large production gap and will require serious attention in order to meet
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statewide demand. Arizona and Oregon, both large electricity exporters to California, have
experienced significant population growths over the past decade, limiting electricity surpluses
and therefore their ability to provide California with extra power (Alvardo and Griffin, 2007).
California’s population is still growing, albeit by a decreasing rate, so growth in electricity
production will have to at least match this increasing demand. Efficiency regulations will
certainly help in closing this production/consumption gap, but will by no means account for the
full 30%. Therefore, California must expand use of renewable sources.
Consumption
Understanding the consumption landscape for electricity is also important for
policymakers. Unlike production statistics, looking at electricity consumption reveals significant
demographic characteristics that can be used to form demand-side programs and regulations.
Consumption can be broken down in several different ways, particularly by sector, which may
allow for more pointed renewable policies and efficiency standards. Also, remembering the 30%
supply gap and subsequent importation of electricity, the type of energy that ends up being
consumed in California does not necessarily parallel the source percentages of in-state
production. This is an important distinction and one that must be considered when creating
effective climate policy.
California energy consumption was last reported in 2011 at 284,953 GWh, according to
the California Energy Commission. This consumption has been on a steady incline since detailed
reporting began in 1990, when total energy consumption amounted to 229,868 GWh. This
represents a 23.9% increase in just two decades. California gross energy consumption falls
behind only Texas, where electricity plays a major role in oil and gas extraction. Similar to
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yearly consumption, peak demand2 has also increased, from 35,000MWh in 1980 to over
65,000MWh today (Marshall and Gorin, 2007). Peak demand represents the highest point of
demand during any given day and, as revealed by the statistics, is much more sensitive to
population increases. This is a result of consumption trends along various sectors.
When breaking consumption down by sector, we see that commercial and residential
users far outweigh the industrial and agricultural sectors. Together, the commercial and
residential sectors account for approximately 218,000 GWh, or 76% of total consumption. Not
only do these sectors already enjoy the largest pieces of the consumption pie, they are also
experiencing steady increases in consumption. On the other hand, consumption in the remaining
two sectors has remained fairly constant over the last few decades and is not forecasted to
increase. With respect to the industrial sector, the static consumption rate can be attributed to a
decrease in manufacturing as a percentage of California GDP. Similarly, agriculture only
amounts to approximately 2% of California’s GDP, hardly making it a considerable electricity
consumer.
It is important to identify which sectors are energy intensive for a couple reasons. First,
remembering California’s 30% supply gap, the introduction of new energy sources, i.e.
renewable electricity, should be located near intensive users to minimize transaction costs. This
makes a strong case for distributed electricity generation, an argument that will be made in more
depth later in this paper. Another reason to identify top electricity consumers is to better target
product efficiency standards. For example, commercial and residential buildings rely heavily on
electricity for heating, cooling, and lighting, whereas the industrial and agricultural sectors rely
on electricity for mostly mechanical processes. Consequently, efficiency standards should be
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2	
  Peak demand is a particularly difficult challenge for renewable energy, as peak supply must be consistent every day of the year. Conventional
electricity can easily provide the load balancing necessary to meet demand at all hours of the day, including peak demand. This is a major
challenge for the renewable energy sector and one that will hopefully be solved through technological advancement.
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targeted at home and commercial appliances such as air conditioners, light bulbs, and other large
appliances. Both of these reasons for consumer identification have significant environmental
implications that will help achieve California’s future emission goals.
From a per capita perspective, California again finds itself atop the national rankings for
the right reasons. Per capita consumption in California over the last ten years has remained
between 7,000-7,500 KWh/person/year. This is compared to a national average of nearly 12,000
KWh, a number that has increase by nearly 40% over the last 30 years. California’s low per
capita consumption is the result of strict building and home appliance efficiency standards (CEC
Online Database). For example, California regulations demand that a standard home refrigerator
cannot consume more than .1(refrigerator volume in feet)+2.04 KWh per day. The list of
appliance regulations is exhaustive and incredibly precise, accounting for every possible
variation in the type of appliance (CEC, 2010). Many states do not have as strict standards, or
any standards at all, leading to higher per capita electricity consumption.
Despite California’s progressive looking electricity production portfolio and per capita
electricity consumption, their involvement in the national electricity market reveals some serious
problems. Of the 30% of imported electricity, nearly 80% of was produced using coal-burning
power plants, specifically from the Navajo Station in Arizona and the Four Corners installation
on the Arizona-New Mexico border. This amounts to nearly 70,000 GW of electricity per year
that is far from clean and would severely hamper California’s progressive reputation if produced
in state. The remaining 20% of imported electricity is produced from nuclear plants in Arizona
and hydroelectric plants in the Upper Northwest, leaving a remainder of 0% for truly renewable
sources. This analysis of import consumption alone is enough to reveal that electricity
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consumption in California is not as green as its production, a trend that should be combatted by
environmental and renewable energy policy.
Electricity consumption in California paints a very different picture than production when
evaluating the state’s progressive reputation. Unfortunately, consumption seems to be less
environmentally friendly than California production, utilizing a larger percentage of fossil fuels,
specifically coal. This is a result of demand outweighing supply, making it necessary to import a
large percentage of its annual electricity consumption. If electricity demand continues to grow in
states bordering California like it has over the past decade, importing electricity will become
more expensive and less feasible. This may, however, be a blessing in disguise, as it will further
encourage the proliferation of renewable electricity and its positive environmental externalities.
Environmental policy must take into account demand-side trends, especially trends across sectors,
in order to effectively reduce emissions.

II. Electricity Demand: Forecast of the Future
Forecasting future electricity demand is a challenging but necessary task when planning
to improve a state’s electricity portfolio. The sheer number of variables that affect demand is
exhausting, ranging from yearly temperature trends to changes in technology over time. Due to
this high degree of uncertainty, it is necessary to calculate a bracket of future demand, including
a low and high estimate depending on different factor outcomes. The high electricity demand
case accounts for high economic and demographic growth along with relatively low electricity
prices and low self-generation rates. Vice versa, the low demand case assumes low growth rates
and strong participation in efficiency programs and self-generation.
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The California Energy Commission predicts that electricity consumption will increase to

over 320,000 GWH by 2016. However, the annual rate of consumption growth is forecasted to
fall to 1.29% between 2008 and 2016, down from 1.98% between 2000 and 2008 (Marks, 2007).
This decrease in growth rate is due to several factors. First, the recession in 2008 severely
impacted California’s economic growth, dropping state GDP growth from 3.1% in 2006 to .4%
by the end of 2008. This significant decrease will take years if not decades to reverse, causing
California’s electricity consumption to also lag. Secondly, relatively mild weather between 2008
and 2010 reduced electricity consumption associated with air conditioning and heating. Weather
in recent years however, has proven more extreme and should be absorbed into the next round of
forecasts, most likely pushing consumption upward. Lastly, California’s population growth has
slowed to less than 1 percent a year, down from nearly 1.5% during the 1990s (Goodridge, 2007).
The overall future trends in consumption are paralleled at the sector level, with net
growth bolstered by significant increases in the residential and commercial areas over the
coming decades (See Figure 1). Energy consumption in the industrial and agricultural sectors is
forecasted to remain unchanged, staying at 42,500 and 20,000 GWh/year, respectively. On the
other hand, commercial and residential energy consumption is expected to continue its increase
through 2018. Here in 2012, the commercial and residential sectors consume 118,000 and
100,000 GWh/year, respectively. These numbers are expected to increase to 122,000 and
116,000 by 2018 (Marshall and Gorin, 2007).
Along with estimates for a substantial increase in yearly net consumption, the California
Energy Commission predicts that peak demand will also increase, although relatively modestly.
The middle case of their forecast model predicts an increase of 8-9%, from approximately
65,000MWh to over 70,000MWh by 2016. But again, the rate of growth is less than in previous
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periods. Unlike yearly consumption, peak demand is affected by other mechanisms. This time,
the CEC specifically cites household generation, specifically photovoltaic, as a key factor in the
decline in peak demand growth. An increase in self-generation using PV is predicted to be the
result of decreasing technology costs and increases in government programs. Programs that
encourage household PV that are currently in place include the California Solar Initiative, New
Solar Homes Partnership, and the Self-Generation Incentive Program.
From a per capita perspective, the CEC predicts that energy consumption will plateau
around 7600 KWh/year and begin to fall slightly over the next half decade. Self-generation will
again play a large role in this trend, along with the continuing decline of California’s population
growth (Metz et al, 2012). Another major factor that has yet to be discussed is the changing
behavior of consumers. Individual preferences will most likely shift as environmental initiatives
become more popular, consequently increasing demand for green products, including renewable
electricity. This is an important demand-side factor and one that will be discussed later in this
paper.
Demand forecasts can be somewhat unreliable as they are strongly tied to trends that are
difficult to predict. That being said, forecasts do provide valuable insight into demand growth
under a variety of economic, demographic, and environmental circumstances. Forecasts also
allude to the direction of emissions, which closely follow the trends in consumption. The
environmental effects implied in these demand forecasts are certainly dire and must be addressed.
Legislators should make a strong effort to understand both the methods and results of such
forecasts when prescribing policies to encourage renewable electricity production and emissions
reduction.
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III. California Climate and Energy Policy: Goals of AB32 and Energy Implications
The United States ranks second in the world in carbon dioxide emissions, releasing a total
of 6.5 billion metric tons of CO2 per year. As the most prevalent greenhouse gas, CO2 is directly
responsible for the increased levels of thermal radiation occurring in Earth’s atmosphere.
California currently ranks 12th in the world among carbon emitters, above entire countries such
as Brazil, Spain, France, and Australia (EPA, 2012). California’s annual emission of 450
MMTCO2 accounts for approximately 6% of United States total emissions, again falling behind
only Texas. Transportation and the industrial sector are by far the worst offenders, accounting for
37.9% and 19.5%, respectively. Although in-state electricity generation only accounts for
approximately 12.3% of carbon emissions, the electricity sector’s share of emissions jumps to
23% with the addition of electricity imports (ARB, 2007) (See Figure 2). Legislators need to
devise policies that effectively target both in-state and out-of-state generation.
Although the use of fossil fuels in electricity generation is relatively cheap, pricing does
not take into account the environmental externalities associated with their combustion. For
instance, the coal industry is responsible for a variety of different environmental hazards, from
the initial mining stage to the transportation and combustion stages. Along with a host of other
toxic heavy metals, coal releases a large amount of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrous
oxide upon combustion (Epstein et al, 2011). Natural gas combustion, although much cleaner
than coal combustion, emits methane gas. Methane emissions amount to less than .5% of United
States carbon dioxide emissions, but account for approximately 10% of the greenhouse effect
(US Department of Energy, 2009). Natural gas also requires substantial infrastructure in the form
of piping that poses a significant land use challenge. It is these methods that new energy
legislature aims to curtail in favor of environmental responsible energy production.
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California’s environmental policy is complex and exhaustive, however most pieces of

legislature are aimed at achieving one key goal—lowering greenhouse gas emissions to 1990
levels by 2020 and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 (See Figure 3). In order to curb emissions,
California legislators passed the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (Assembly Bill 32).
AB32 set a variety of emissions goals and supporting mechanisms across many offending sectors,
including the electricity sector. First, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) mandated
GHG emissions reporting for all large industrial plants, suppliers of transportations fuels,
electricity providers, etc. In addition to this reporting, CARB also established a cap and trade
system3 for GHG emissions, effectively incentivizing the reduction of emissions for offenders
across all industries. AB32 also targets fuel consumption in the transportation and construction
sectors by mandating efficiency standards for automobiles, passenger vehicles, households, and
commercial spaces. Lastly, AB32 targets the electricity sector specifically by setting a portfolio
goal of 33% renewable energy production by 2020 and approximately 67% by 2050 (CEC 2011).
Plans to achieve this goal involve a variety of market-based solutions, particularly programs that
improve the competitiveness of electricity produced by renewable sources through incentivizing
adoption of green generation technology. Along with stricter renewable portfolio standards4,
AB32 also aims to encourage “green” consumerism in the electricity sector by appealing to a
variety of individual behaviors and community social norms.
AB32 relies on four, overarching measures in order to reach the 2020 and 2050 emissions
goals for the electricity sector. The first is aggressive efficiency regulation with regards to energy
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3	
  The cap and trade system serves as the backbone for reducing GHG emissions in California. Certificates for emissions are issued and traded
among offending firms depending on their offsetting needs. The number of certificates is reduced over time to incentivize cleaner technology.
While experts struggle to determine the actual cost of damages associated with GHG emissions, the cap and trade system is quickly forcing the
largest offenders to internalize the costs using an auction-based system. Any policy encouraging renewable energy should cooperate with cap and
trade mechanisms.
4	
  Renewable portfolio standard simply refers to the overall percentage increase in renewable energy provided by utility companies. The goal of
33% renewable electricity in California by 2020 represents an increase in the renewable portfolio standard.
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consumption. Although this is a major staple for the reduction of emissions in the transportation
sector with concern to liquid fuel, this also targets end-use electricity products such as home
appliances, air conditioning, and light bulbs. The second measure is the overall electrification of
California’s energy production. The more machines and automobiles that can run on electricity
the better, as the use of electricity is far less emissions-heavy than conventional fuel, especially
when produced using renewable sources. Next, AB32 aims to decarbonized electricity
production while doubling supply. Sustainable technology is already available in the form of
renewable source generation, but development must continue in order for these sources to
become competitive. And lastly, when electrification is not a possibility, AB32 calls for other
decarbonization methods for conventional energy production, specifically the use of nuclear
technology as a substitute and carbon capture and storage (CCS) when the burning of fossil fuels
is absolutely unavoidable.
Although electrification and decarbonization already come hand in hand for some
production methods, specifically nuclear and fossil fuel with CCS, there are other drawbacks that
hinder their feasibility. First, nuclear production has been and continues to be unpopular in the
public eye, especially after the Fukushima disaster following the Japanese tsunami in 2011.
Nuclear production not only draws questions on safety, but also poses a particular challenge in
nuclear waste disposal. Both of these externalities would have to be examined thoroughly before
proposing new legislation. Energy production via fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage has
been shown to be fairly carbon-neutral, with some technology able to sequester approximately
80% of emissions. However, cost-effective technology is still not widely available. Not to
mention, CCS requires a vast amount of underground carbon sinks and at the end of the day still
relies on fossil fuels. These technologies may be sufficient options to offset some externalities
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associated with traditional generation methods, but neither represents a long-term solution in
their current forms. Therefore, we must look to improve renewable electricity technologies and
methods.
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Chapter 2: Renewable Energy Technology and Market Challenges

With nuclear generation and carbon capture and storage still caught in technological and
social approval limbo, renewable sources represent the most feasible choice in long-term,
environmentally responsible electricity production. Renewable electricity not only represents a
low-emissions alternative to conventional sources, but also brings a host of other environmental
benefits. These benefits include the reduction of water consumption, noise, waste, adverse landuse, and thermal pollution. However, these benefits currently come at a premium. Technology
associated with renewable electricity is fairly new and the research and development costs have
proven significant. This presents the renewable electricity sector with some serious challenges
within the greater electricity sector, where conventional technology enjoys a variety of economic
advantages.
Renewable energy production in California currently sits at 15.2% of total production,
well above the national average of less than 5%. However, this percentage must be more than
doubled to meet the energy portfolio mix demanded by AB32. Currently, geothermal5 energy
accounts for 46.8% of all renewable energy produced, followed by wind (28%) and biomass
(21.3%). Solar energy currently accounts for just 3.9% of all renewable energy production (Long,
2011). This chapter will outline the environmental advantages offered by renewable electricity
sources before going into the market challenges faced by these budding technologies.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5	
  Geothermal energy, although clean by conventional standards, is marred by other economic and environmental issues that put its long-term
feasibility in question. First, geothermal water contains dissolved solids and gases that can be very toxic. Geothermal sites have also proven to be
finite, with some of the older sites in California already experiencing a significant decrease in output. Therefore, geothermal energy does not offer
the same long-term potential as other sources, particularly sunlight and wind.
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I. Environmental Advantages
As described in Chapter 1, conventional energy sources pose a variety of very serious
environmental threats including air and water pollution, waste production, and adverse land use.
These environmental impacts subsequently cause a wide range of health concerns including the
increased risk of respiratory disease, heart disease, and lung cancer (World Health Organization,
1999). Renewable energy sources effectively minimize all these negative effects, while also
assisting in the reduction of existing pollution.
The reduction of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions is undeniably the greatest
triumph for renewable energy. Excluding biomass, which does result in some GHG emissions,
renewable energy sources eliminate the emissions of several key gases including sulfur oxides,
the main cause of acid rain; nitrogen oxides, which are responsible for the creation of groundlevel ozone; and carbon dioxide, the kingpin of global warming. Solar and wind are almost
completely carbon neutral, only emitting harmful gases during the transportation and
construction of their necessary infrastructure (Smutny, 2007).
Renewable electricity sources also result in almost no waste production. Conventional
sources, especially coal, result in millions of tons of waste associated with extraction of the
necessary natural resource. For example, only a small percentage of a mined area is usable coal,
the rest consists of unusable ore and shale that is left behind in giant piles referred to as “spoil
tips” (Epstein et al, 2011). Not only does wind and solar energy production avoid the extraction
externalities caused by fossil fuel sources, the materials used to construct solar panels and wind
turbines can be successfully recycled.
Lastly, the amount of land necessary for renewable electricity generation can be much
less than conventional sources. Reducing land use is an important goal from an ecological
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standpoint. Mining and the construction of pipelines for oil and natural gas have displaced many
species and destroyed thousands of acres of natural habitats. On the other hand, wind turbines
have been found to cause almost no issues for wildlife, including bird species, and their plot size
is very small in comparison to conventional plants (The National Academy of Sciences, 2007).
The land-use advantages are less clear-cut for solar panel installations, which undeniably
increase in cost-effectiveness as their size increases. That being said, distributed, rooftop solar
panel installations may be the future, in which land displacement would be almost negligible.
Technological advancement of photovoltaic solar panels should see this as a priority moving
forward.
The environmental drawbacks for renewable electricity production are few and far
between. Most negative environmental impacts are incurred during the initial stages of
construction, as construction machines and vehicles are still powered almost exclusively by
fossil fuels. As technology improves, even these small environmental detractors will cease to
exist, leaving a process that is carbon neutral from day one. In terms of land use, although largescale renewable installations do require fairly large plots of land, the acreage pales in comparison
to land that is irreversibly damaged by mining. If the value of these positive environmental
externalities was monetized, renewable energy would quickly become much more competitive in
the energy sector. Although the California cap and trade system is starting to account for
environmental hazards, the playing field is still tipped in favor of conventional energy.

II. Market Failures and Barriers to Entry
Proper examination of market failures and barriers for renewable energy is the most
important aspect of effective policymaking. Market failures exist on both the supply and demand
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side of the electricity sector. Failures arise due to less-than-rational decision-making on the part
of the firm and on the part of the consumer. Poor decision-making exhibited by the firm leads to
market failures, while irrationality on the behalf of the consumer is identified as a behavioral
failure. On the other hand, market barriers are defined as any disincentive to adopt the
technology. Policies will have to design mechanisms that properly mitigate all three of these
issues in order to truly encourage renewable energy proliferation.
Despite their value in terms of sustainability and emissions, renewable sources remain
uncompetitive in the greater electricity market without the assistance of government programs
and subsidies. For example, the cost of 1KWh of electricity produced by solar is approximately
$.22, compared to approximately $.04/KWh for coal (See Figure 4). If the price of electricity
generated from conventional sources appropriately internalized the cost of the negative
externalities associated with production this price disparity would be much less (Allcott,
Mullainathan, Taubinsky, 2012). However, these environmental externalities are not accounted
for, causing the largest market failure in the electricity sector. This externalities market failure is
then accompanied by failures associated with national security and asymmetric information.
The environmental externality market failure might seem like a rather obvious issue, but
the challenge lies in quantifying the environmental impacts. Actions that affect ecological and
biological processes are difficult to assess because the impacts are difficult to attribute to the
source. For example, should the increase in healthcare costs associated with asthma caused by
poor air quality be attributed to harmful emissions from automobiles, power plants, or heavy
industry? In addition to this confusion, researchers have a difficult time quantifying the monetary
cost of damage caused by emissions. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on
Economic Advisors have examined the cost of damages caused by carbon dioxide emissions and
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concluded with results ranging from $5.50-72 per ton of CO2. Other studies conducted by
independent analysis groups have resulted in much higher damage costs, some totaling over $800
per ton of CO2. Although the emissions cap and trade system has begun to account for these
externalities, they still represent a major market failure in the electricity sector.
National security also creates major inefficiency in the energy market that is often
overlooked. Oil and natural gas reserves are very geographical concentrated, falling in a
relatively small number of countries, of which the majority are politically unstable. The United
States spends a significant amount of money to ensure the security of these reserves and the
steady stream of supply back to the US. This expenditure is again an unaccounted for externality
of the conventional energy market. Renewable energy does not require any such security, yet its
price does not reflect this convenience (Owen, 2004). Or rather, the price of conventional energy
does not reflect this security inconvenience. Consequently, renewable energy is again under-used.
Lastly, the general lack of information concerning all the aforementioned externalities
and market failures keeps the public uninformed of the advantages of renewable sources.
Because renewable electricity is a relatively new industry, there have been relatively few
comprehensive studies conducted. It is difficult to assess the success of the industry or its
comparative advantages over conventional energy when data collection has been limited to a
handful of years. Information will increase over time, but the current lack of information is
affecting behavioral factors that will be difficult to reverse, a challenge that will be analyzed
shortly.
In addition to market failures are inherent disadvantages associated with renewable
technologies and their associated resources. The most significant intrinsic disadvantage faced by
renewable electricity is its high variability (Poortinga, Steg, Vlek, 2002). That is to say,
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renewable technology is, and will always be, at the mercy of Mother Nature. There are hopes to
mitigate variability in the future by improving energy storage technology for renewable
electricity, but it remains a major flaw until then. As long as this disadvantage persists, investors
will be faced with some added risk, a serious detractor when encouraging capital flows into the
industry.
Increased variability leads to a second intrinsic disadvantage in an unreliable loadbalancing schedule. Using conventional sources, utility firms can produce power exactly when it
is most needed, specifically during peak demand hours in the late afternoon when air
conditioning and appliances are being utilized. Renewable sources don’t necessarily follow the
load trends during a given day and the technology necessary to store such electricity for later
deployment has yet to be perfected. This poses a serious challenge for utility companies, who
must be able to supply enough electricity at all hours of the day. California residents may recall
the electricity crisis of 2001 that resulted in massive rolling blackouts and lead to the bankruptcy
of Pacific Gas and Electric and the near-bankruptcy of Southern California Edison (Goyette,
2011). Although this shortage in supply was the result of external factors, this crisis exemplifies
the pressure under which utility companies are to meet demand. These issues of uncertainty
posed by renewable electricity represent long-term and even permanent challenges.
Lastly, the most significant barrier to entry in the renewable energy market is simply the
high technological cost (See Figure 4). The technology associated with each renewable source is
relatively new and therefore expensive. Learning-by-doing and economies of scale will help
reduce the cost, but at the expense of time (See Figure 5). Learning-by-doing refers to the
increase in productivity that comes naturally after repeating a process over and over again, i.e.
the more solar panels a construction worker installs, the better he gets at it. On the other hand,
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economies of scale refer to the increase of productivity that comes with expansion, i.e. larger
solar installations are more cost-effective than smaller installations because the fixed costs are
divided by a larger amount of panels. As technology develops and installation methods are
perfected, renewable sources will certainly become more economically viable (Beck, Martinot,
2004). However, this growth must be actively incentivized now in order to ensure its costeffectiveness in the future when resources for conventional energy run scarce.
The market failures, inherent disadvantages, and entry barriers that currently exist in the
renewable electricity market pose significant challenges for the growth of the industry. Some of
these issues are being addressed by current policies; others will slowly fade as conventional
resources become more scarce and unsustainable. However, the speed at which these issues are
addressed is a problem in and of itself and must be expedited by further policy and more
stringent regulation. To make matters worse, many of these failures and disadvantages are
compounded by behavioral factors. Consumers, like firms, often do not behave in the rational
manner that theory suggests. It is important to analyze these behavioral factors and their effect on
the growth and implementation of renewable technologies.

III. Behavioral and Social Challenges
Another significant challenge associated with moving California towards a greener future
is encouraging the necessary shift in public opinion. Any given program may in fact introduce
the appropriate mechanism to drive the production of renewable electricity, but it must be framed
in a way that captures the positive behaviors of the average consumer and attracts their
participation. “Green” consumerism has certainly improved over the last decade as people
continue to demand cars with better gas mileage and water bottles with thinner plastic. However,
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the reasons for this increase in demand are sometimes misguided. For many consumers, better
gas mileage is simply a way to alleviate pain at the pump, rather than a means to reduce
emissions and curb global climate change (Litvine, Wustenhagen, 2011). The effects of many
incentive programs, particularly subsidies such as the feed-in tariff, and the adoption of
renewable electricity are much less cut-and-dry, making it even more difficult to encourage
adoption. A successful policy concerning renewable energy should not only appeal to consumers’
wallet, but also to their conscience.
The adoption of innovative products, including green electricity, can be framed in five
steps. These steps concern cognitive and behavioral factors and how they affect an individual’s
decision to participate in a pro-environmental behavior or not (Diaz-Rainey, Ashton, 2010). Step
one is the gathering of knowledge on an environmental issue and the innovative technology that
is supposed to address it, or rather the general improvement of environmental awareness. Step
two is the formation of an attitude towards the technology. Step three is the resulting decision to
either accept or reject the technology. And lastly, step four and five concern the actual
implementation of the technology and the confirmation of its effectiveness. Successful policy
should guide the consumer through these steps to ensure the greatest chance of actual
implementation and the subsequent establishment of strong social norms in favor of
environmentalism.
Encouraging Awareness Before Action
Green consumerism is only possible when consumers adopt a greater sense of
environmental awareness. This awareness does not only stem from knowing an issue exists, but
also from understanding the causes and effects behind its existence and the possible actions that
might be taken to curtail its consequences. There are many factors that affect an individual’s
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environmental awareness, some more influential than others. Researchers have explored the
effects that knowledge and information have on improving this awareness. Studies have also
proposed links to human rationality and moral obligations, both of which seem to be strong
influencing factors.
Environmental knowledge can be broken down into several different types, each with its
own effect on an individual’s actions. The first and simplest form of environmental knowledge is
factual knowledge, or the understanding of relevant definitions, mechanisms, and causes of
environmental problems. After this comes procedural knowledge, which refers to the awareness
of possible actions and behavioral factors associated with environmentalism (Tobler, 2011).
Although both these forms of knowledge seem like significant factors in pro-environmental
behavior, studies have shown that even this level of knowledge has moderate effects on actual
participation. The pinnacle of these two types of knowledge is effectiveness knowledge, which
refers to the understanding of the relative effectiveness of different actions seeking a certain
outcome. This type of knowledge requires both factual and procedural knowledge, yet also is
found to have a relatively weak relationship with pro-environmental behavior. Researchers
surmise that this relationship is hindered by the difficulty to match knowledge across all three
types. That is to say, an individual might be aware of the facts and solutions concerning a given
issue, but not necessarily the effectiveness of the solutions. Feed-in tariffs will have to take into
consideration all levels of knowledge, or lack thereof.
In terms of climate change, studies show that the majority of the population knows
relatively little about its causes and consequences. First and foremost, there seems to be general
confusion surrounding the difference between weather and climate, with individuals often using
the terms synonymously or even in the reverse. The confusion increases as the idea becomes
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more specific, such as the facts surrounding ozone depletion or the role of greenhouse gases in
climate change. Although consumers can be motivated without completely understanding the
mechanisms behind global climate change, this does pose a significant challenge.
Two other models have been developed in accordance to environmental awareness, one
associated with rationality and the other morality. The first model concerns ecological behavior,
or human’s inherent use of logic in decision-making. This model states that an individual will act
pro-environmentally if the action is framed by incentives, such as monetary savings, and
consequences, such as health costs associated with pollution (Osbaldiston, Schott, 2011). The
only drawback to this model is that it is perhaps too optimistic of our ability to be rational. We
often make decisions that go against the supporting evidence. The second model, called the
value-belief-norm, comes from an ethical approach, examining morality and its effect on proenvironmental behavior. Researchers point to our awareness of our effects on a fragile biosphere
and the sense of responsibility that accompanies it. Intergenerational equity also plays a role, as
humans tend to want to leave a better world for the next generation, namely their children. This
model also falls a bit short in explaining environmentalism, as recent economic worries have
eclipsed moral obligations under certain circumstances.
It is clear that environmental awareness is achieved through a variety of different factors
involving both knowledge and intrinsic cognitive functions, and that each individual will be
differently affected by these factors. Consequently, pro-environmental behavior is the result of
acting on any combination of information or emotional and social thought processes. Because
there is such a wide variety of motivating factors across individuals, it is difficult to design a
campaign that appeals to a majority of the population. Policymakers should make a point to
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determine which factors have the most effect on the local population, especially for policies as
specific as a feed-in tariff for renewable electricity.
Attitude: Reversing Negative Perceptions and Framing Benefits
Two of the most popular, and therefore most difficult to reverse, consumer perceptions
towards renewable technology are that it is too expensive and that it is less functional than
existing technology. The first perception is caused by the consumer’s failure to properly consider
all the costs and benefits associated with renewable energy technology, specifically the social
benefits. The second perception is due to a general lack of understanding stemming from the
environmental awareness factors described above. In terms of framing a green product, such as
photovoltaics, it is important to frame their value not only in terms of functionality, costs, and
expected outcomes but also in terms of the consumer’s identity, image, and social norms within
the greater community.
The consumer’s failure to fully analyze the costs and benefits presented by renewable
electricity, and the resulting perception that the technology is too expensive, is a result of his or
her bounded rationality (Ozaki, 2009). Bounded rationality is a psychological theory that states
that human’s decision-making abilities are hindered by limited information, limited cognitive
abilities, and the finite amount of time they have to make any given decision. It is undeniable
that the costs and benefits surrounding green energy are complex and sometimes difficult to
discern altogether. Economic costs are difficult to determine due to the industry’s dynamic
nature and the speed at which the market responds to fluctuations in demand for and supply of
conventional electricity. On the other hand, the social costs and benefits of green electricity are
even harder to quantify. The monetary costs of avoiding greenhouse gas emissions are a
contentious subject, as are the health costs associated with poor air quality. The average
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consumer does not have the ability to crunch all these numbers, often leading to inaction when
faced with the decision to adopt green electricity.
The second perception, belief that green technology is not as functional or reliable as
conventional technology, is the result of our limited attention. Similar to bounded rationality,
limited attention is our psychological tendency to lose interest in a subject over time and as the
complexity of the subject increases. In addition to our inability to fully consider the costs and
benefits of renewable technology, we tend to be intimidated by the sheer size of environmental
issues and the complexity of the solutions that have been proposed (Masini, Menichetti, 2010).
The Earth as a biosphere is as dynamic as it gets, involving ecological systems that take experts
decades, if not centuries, to fully understand. It is no surprise that the average consumer often
chooses to maintain his or her blissful ignorance.
In terms of solutions and technological advancement, consumers perhaps find solace in
the relative simplicity of existing methods and technology. The processes necessary in creating
energy from fossil fuels are fairly straightforward—coal is burned, water is heated, steam turns
turbine, television turns on. We tend to lose our attention when faced by the more technical
explanation of photovoltaic solar systems for example, which rely on processes that are much
less “physical” than those associated with fossil fuels. This xenophobia could be combatted if the
benefits of renewable technology were better (i.e. more simply) framed.
The perceived benefits of adopting green energy can be broken down into two categories:
utilitarian and psychological. Utilitarian benefits are most closely associated with traditional
decision-making; or rather the perception that a green product has additional benefits, and that if
these benefits outweigh the cost premium of the product the consumer will adopt the technology.
In the case of renewable energy technologies, many consumers rightly believe that green energy
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decelerates climate change and reduces pollution and energy dependency (although they don’t
necessarily understand the science behind it). However, despite this positive outlook on
renewable electricity, the negative perceptions described above outweigh the willingness to pay
this premium. Another significant drawback is that utilitarian benefits of renewable energy are
difficult to see on the individual level, as noticeable environmental results are really only
achieved once there is collective participation. This factor is particularly difficult to overcome at
the individual level no matter how a policy is framed, as it simply relies on the participation of a
larger group.
The psychological benefits are more tailored to the individual and include the “warm
glow effect” and self-expression benefits. Unlike utilitarian benefits that are only realized after
significant, community adoption of a green technology is achieved; warm glow effect is simply
the individual’s psychological response to positively contributing to a common good. Some of
this response can be attributed to altruism. However, the warm glow effect also suggests that
some consumers are willing to buy a premium product not because of its environmentally
positive impacts, but because it makes them feel better about themselves (Hartmann, ApaolazaIbanez, 2012). This positive psychological response is seen in other pro-social behaviors, such as
donating to charity and volunteering. Although it may be argued that pure altruism is more
ethical, the results are the same, therefore good policy should target both.
Self-expression benefits refer to an individual’s status projection within a group or
community. Here, the satisfaction comes from signaling to community members by making
decisions and taking actions that are deemed as positive by established social norms. Consumers
make signaling purchases all the time, from sports cars to designer clothes. Renewable electricity
generation is symbolic of the individual’s environmental awareness and sense of responsibility,
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two desirable social norms. However, consumers make signaling purchases because they
perceive the benefits to outweigh the costs. Although being responsible and environmentally
aware might both be desirable, for many the costs are simply greater than the expected utility.
Policies should aim at increasing this perception of utility in order to tip the scales in favor of
adoption.
Evoking these benefits is the key challenge for a successful campaign for green
electricity proliferation. Establishing a positive attitude by reversing current perceptions will of
course be difficult, due to behavioral factors such as limited attention and bounded rationality,
but certainly not impossible. Policies should be able to address cost through technological
advancement on the supply side while also improving consumer perception and willingness to
pay. Policies should first target behavioral factors at the individual level, before pursuing the
psychological benefits of being part of a larger participation group. However, increasing the
perceived utility of renewable electricity is not enough, the adoption process itself must also be
framed as a positive, or at least manageable, experience.
Adoption and Implementation: Acting on Attitude
Studies have found that consumers, even those that identify themselves as “green
thinking,” often do not adopt new technology despite claiming a willingness to pay a premium
for green products (Jacobsen, LaRiviere, 2012). This discrepancy is caused by the belief that the
adoption process is too inconvenient. Although this is partly true, a fact that will be addressed
later in this paper, this perception must be reversed to ensure participation when the adoption
process is eventually streamlined. Even if the perception of inconvenience did not exist, many
consumers admit that they are hesitant to be the first to adopt, and that they would be much more
willing to take the plunge if the norm was already established. Renewable energy policy will
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have to devise a scheme to induce the proverbial “snowball effect” in order to increase adoption
of the technology.
The current processes necessary in adopting renewable electricity technology are less
than convenient. The application process, especially in the state of California, is time consuming,
both to fill out the initial paperwork and for the paperwork to be correctly processed. Information
is not readily available on either the specific eligibility requirements or the transition process
itself. All of these issues are compounded by limited time, causing even the greenest consumer to
abandon the adoption process. These inconveniences all chip away at the perceived benefit of
adopting the technology. So even though a great deal of consumers say they would be willing to
pay a premium for environmentally-friendly products, when actually faced with transition costs
the adoption rate falls dramatically.
The lack of strong, specific social norms also tends to hinder adoption rates for renewable
technology. A qualitative study conducted by Ozaki found that, despite believing in the positive
effects of renewable energy, consumers were often hesitant to be the first of their respective
communities to adopt. Other studies examining social norms have found that fluid adoption does
not take place until 10-25% of the local population has adopted the technology or product. For
example, only .6% of California households have been equipped with photovoltaic systems,
perhaps a reason for, and not just a result of, the stagnant adoption rate. When coupled with a
perception of inconvenience, this hesitation can easily tip the scales against adopting the
technology. Some programs, including those part of the California Solar Initiative, have been
implemented to entice adopters in the short-term by offering upfront financing assistance on
renewable installations. However, programs that target adoption through long-term assistance,
such as a feed-in tariff, should be just as convincing if framed correctly.
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Nowhere has technology adoption through social norms been so dramatic than the

proliferation of online social media over the last decade. The adoption rate for media outlets such
as Facebook, Twitter, and Google+ are significantly exponential, clearly exhibiting a
quintessential snowball effect6. In fact, the effect is so strong that Google+ reached 10 million
users in just 16 days, as it was strongly framed as superior to the industry leader, Facebook.
Social media outlets become more valuable and productive the more users they receive. The
same is true for renewable energy, as evidenced by the growing presence of utilitarian benefits as
adoption increases. There is now a social stigma associated with those who do not participate in
social media; successful energy policy should try to create a similar perception in regards to
conventional electricity.
Barriers to adoption create a very specific group of actual adopters, whose demographics
might actually be a discouraging force for other consumers considering adoption. There are two
large groups that remain after all the current barriers have been experienced: consumers with
significant, expendable income and consumers who value pro-environmental behavior extremely
high (Roper, 2003). The first group sees the economic cost of adoption as very small in
comparison to their wealth and is, regrettably, fairly homogenous in terms of ethnicity. The
second group, arguably an even smaller segment of the population than the first, views the
benefits of pro-environmental behavior so highly that the premium is almost negligible. Both of
these groups represent distinctive minorities, causing other segments of the population to feel
alienated from the cause, and therefore made even less likely to adopt the technology. An
effective policy should strive to encourage a diverse group of adopters to ensure that segments of
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
6	
  The snowball effect is closely related to Metcalfe’s law, especially in regards to networks. Metcalfe’s law states that the value of a network is
proportional to the square of the number of connected users. For example, two Facebook users can only make one connection, but 5 users can
make 10 connections and 10 users can make 66 connections. Adopting renewable energy is not explicitly part of a network, but the adoption rates
would parallel this idea with the establishment of strong social norms.

	
  

37	
  

the population are not disenfranchised by the formation of strong environmental norms in
minority groups.
Solidifying Social Norms
Not only does solidifying a specific environmental social norm improve the adoption of
that specific technology or habit, it improves the likelihood of other environmental practices
becoming norms as well. Studies show that individuals who already have habits within an
overarching ideology, such as environmentalism, are more likely to continue picking up habits
that fall under that category than those who do not already exhibit any of those habits (Egmond,
Jonkers, Kok, 2004). For example, consumers that purchase high efficiency light bulbs are
probably more likely to adopt renewable electricity than consumers who don’t buy efficient light
bulbs.
Reaching the 10-25% threshold at which a social norm begins to take hold also has
positive effects on technological advancement and, of course, the associated utilitarian benefits.
In terms of renewable energy, a significant increase in adopters leads to a significant increase in
demand and capital flowing into the market. As described in the economic section above, this
influx increases competition within the renewables market and, subsequently, increases
competition in the greater electricity sector. As discussed, utilitarian benefits can be a strong
influence, but only if the benefits are relatively easy to discern. Reaching the social norm
threshold would create a positive feedback loop, in which the utilitarian benefits would become
more distinct, leading to an even greater number of adopters and further strengthening the norm.
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Chapter 3: Criteria and Theoretical Framework for Successful Policy

I. Distribution Type
The first thing that must be considered in creating policy is the desired type of renewable
energy infrastructure, distributed or utility-scale. Until recently, wind and solar installations have
taken the form of very large, concentrated systems. These systems require large amounts of
surface area, leading to their construction out in the deserts away from the more populated areas
of California. These systems, despite taking advantage of the economies of scale associated with
large installations, do pose economic challenges that reduce their feasibility. On the other hand,
distributed rooftop systems tend to represent a more flexible installation option. And although
the cost per KW is higher, distributed installations benefit from a variety of other economic and
environmental aspects.
First, large installations require a considerable amount of land. A newly proposed solar
installation in the Mojave Desert is expected to cover nearly 4,000 acres. This will be the largest
installation in California history and will have a capacity of approximately 550MW. That being
said, several other large installations are currently being completed or have been proposed for the
future, which will undoubtedly cause the displacement of thousands of more acres. Although
these installations pose few threats in terms of pollution7, they do run the risk of disrupting
ecology systems, including the destruction of habitat for species living in the area. Many
desirable areas for renewable electricity installations also coincide with valuable agricultural
land, which will more often than not take precedence.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
7	
  Large solar installations do require a fair amount of water in order to properly clean the panels. This cleaning process may introduce some
contaminants into the water supply. However, very few studies have addressed this question so the effects are generally unknown. One can
surmise that the amount of water pollution certainly depends on what cleaning chemicals are used in addition to water. Water requirements can
also introduce maintenance costs to the project that vary depending on the location of the installation.
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Large installations also decrease feasibility due to the added transportation costs. The

Mojave Desert may be abundant in sunshine, wind, and land but it is geographically distant from
demand. This added distance increases cost in two categories. First, the added distance
significantly increases transportation costs for the necessary construction equipment. Apart from
being costly, the transportation of the renewable technology is by far the most environmentally
destructive aspect of the installation from an emissions standpoint. Secondly, increasing the
distance between supply and demand poses several energy transfer challenges (Evans, 2011).
Good connection to the grid is imperative to maximize efficiency and reliability, two key aspects
that are already a challenge for renewable electricity. The physical infrastructure necessary to
connect to the grid, including advanced transformers, additional power lines, and specialty
meters, is expensive and often incurred by the utility company, further decreasing the incentives
for investing in the renewable technology.
Lastly, large renewable energy installations tend to run into more permitting and
regulation issues than small, distributed systems. The lands on which these installations are
generally built are often designated agricultural or protected wildlife lands. Changing the
necessary zoning regulations can be time consuming and costly. In addition to zoning and
general plan provisions, plans for large installations must also be wary of agricultural
groundwater rights as well as cultural and visual regulations that might be in effect. Not only
does abiding by these various regulations make planning more tedious, the necessary permits and
associated paperwork can be costly and very time consuming.
For example, several projects in the Mojave Desert where delayed for months due to
legal battles activated by environmental groups and Native American tribes. The environmental
groups asserted that the installations would irreversibly damage the ecology of the desert while
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the Native American tribes sought to protect ancient cave paintings and other spiritual sites
located in the area (Helmore, 2012). Installation developers fought back, claiming that losing
even 1/10th of the necessary land would leave the project economical unviable, revealing how
thin the profit margins are for even the largest of projects. Regulatory issues such as these run the
risk of discouraging investors, especially if they persist over the course of months.
In comparison, distributed renewable energy systems effectively combat all the
aforementioned issues, while only facing a few challenges of their own. Distributed systems do
not require nearly as much land, in fact, distributed systems usual occupy land that has already
been developed, such as the case of rooftop solar panels. Small systems rarely displace land that
would otherwise be used for a different purpose. Secondly, distributed systems are often located
where demand is highest. Rooftop solar panels can provide energy for the house or commercial
structure that it is built upon. If the energy is to be sold to a utility, small installations are more
often than not located within the existing grid, reducing the cost of the energy transfer and the
necessary infrastructure. Lastly, distributed systems have to jump through far fewer regulatory
hoops than utility-scale operations. This is mostly the result of the land use advantage, but is also
due to the fact that residential zoning already gives homeowners the right to take advantage of
incident sunlight on their property.
The only significant disadvantages to distributed renewable energy systems concern cost
and ownership. As mentioned before, the cost per kilowatt of capacity is significantly higher for
small-scaled installations, as they fail to take advantage of economies of scale. The actual
installation of the panels represents a large portion of the initial cost, which fails to be displaced
because of the project’s small size. In the long run however, as the construction costs are
absorbed, per KWh cost begins to align with large-scale production costs. Utilities are also less
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likely to invest in distributed production because ownership remains in the hands of the
household or commercial business. Large-scale installations are owned and controlled by utilities,
ensuring that any decisions made are made to benefit the utility firm. Although both of these
issues fall in the favor of utility-scaled installations, the overall benefits of distributed systems
seems to take the upper hand.
Distributed renewable energy systems effectively avoid the economic and political issues
faced by utility-scale installations. Although distributed systems have a few drawbacks of their
own, they certainly represent the future of renewable energy production as land becomes scarcer
and technological costs decrease. This is not to say that doing away with plans for large-scale
systems is also the correct response, as diversity of generation is a valuable characteristic of a
stable and reliable electricity grid. However, the time and space necessary for constructing largescale projects simply do not coincide with the goals set forth by AB32. Existing utility-scaled
projects contribute a significant amount of renewable energy, but the remaining supply gap must
be filled primarily by distributed sources.

II. Policy Criteria for Encouraging Distributed Renewable Energy
When addressing existing policies or devising new policies, it is important to approach the
problem using a consistent lens. Using explicit criteria is especially useful when dealing with
complex issues, a category that renewable electricity growth certainly falls under. Criteria allow
decision makers to discern key differences between policies, particularly by highlighting each
policy’s respective benefits and disadvantages. There are an infinite number of ways to devise
policy that encourages the production of renewable energy; therefore the appropriate set of
criteria must also be extensive.
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•

First, the policy must be effective. Effectiveness can be measured by simply examining
the increase in gross capacity of the renewable electricity technology. This measurement
only concerns capacity and is blind to cost. Not only should a policy be effective, but it
should also be effective in a responsible way. In other words, policies that are over
effective can lead to unforeseen negative effects that may compromise the entire program.

•

Next, a policy should be cost-effective. This measurement concerns the overall cost of
the policy divided by the capacity of the resulting technology. This criteria point is
particularly good when comparing two policies side-by-side. Policymakers should be
savvy to consider both monetary and social costs in this analysis. Although some social
costs (or benefits) are difficult to quantify, as is often the case for environmental products,
they can often be the most significant aspect of a project.

•

Successful policy should consider both short-term and long-term assistance. Depending
on the size of the project and the type of producer, policies should cater to their most
pressing financial needs, whether they be the upfront costs of installation or the cost of
production over time.

•

Renewable energy policy should mitigate uncertainty in the market. Incentive programs
should create a stable investment atmosphere that fosters significant, financial
involvement. Just as in any other market, prospective investors are deterred by risk. The
more certainty a program can promote, the better. In addition, policy should ensure that
existing firms in the sector, specifically investor-owned utilities, are not unfairly
burdened by any remaining risk.

•

Another important market characteristic that policies should strive for is efficiency.
Policies should aim to minimize transaction and other processing costs in order to
streamline adoption. Transaction costs may include administration fees, permit fees, or
the actual infrastructural costs of adopting renewable energy. Minimizing these costs also
ensures that a greater percentage of investment funds go directly to development and
technological research. Efficiency can also refer to the proper accounting of any
externalities associated with the electricity sector, both from conventional and renewable
sources.

•

Next, policy goals and mechanisms should be transparent. Although mechanisms might
be fairly complex, information must be available for those who demand it. All costs must
be accounted for and available to the public. Transparency is also important in terms of
behavioral factors. Improving access to reliable information will hopefully convince
those who may be on the fence in their adoption decision.
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•

A long-term criteria goal for renewable energy involves market conformity. Market
conformity is the creation of a mature, stable, and competitive market. Policies assisting
the proliferation of renewable energy, even long-term policies, must have a well-thoughtout exit strategy that leaves renewable electricity producers able to compete on their own
with conventional sources.

•

Another persistent criteria point is the continual incentivizing of technological
development. Policies should not only encourage pure capacity growth, but also
continuous development toward more efficient and lower-cost technology. Technological
advancement will greatly increase the chances for market conformity as programs expire.

•

Lastly, policies must be cognizant of behavioral factors and social norms. Understanding
these factors will assist in creating a policy that has significant consumer appeal.
Consumer behavior can be targeted in two ways: information availability and framing.
For many consumers, simply being educated on the problem and the proposed solution is
enough to win them over. For those that need further convincing, framing information in
a way that appeals to certain behavioral factors can be very effective.

This set of criteria encompasses the most important characteristics of a successful renewable
energy policy. It is with this lens that I will evaluate the qualities of a feed-in tariff system.
However, before delving into policies in the real world, it is important to understand their
theoretical properties.

III. Theoretical Framework
In order to create successful policy, decision-makers must consider the market failures
and behavioral factors outlined in the previous chapter, as well as the costs and benefits of a
distributed system. Although the ideal, theoretical policy will not be perfectly applicable in the
real world, it is an appropriate place to start in order to understand some of the underlying
economic mechanisms that exist in the market. As a fledgling industry, the renewable electricity
sector must be protected from the competitive nature of the greater energy sector. The two most
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popular policy options are a subsidy and a tariff. A subsidy is assistance paid to a business or
industry by the government or other supporting body in order to prevent the decline or closure of
the business due to persisting unprofitable operations. A tariff on the other hand, is a tax or duty
employed on a certain industry or product, effectively lowering its competitiveness. Successful
policy might include aspects of both a subsidy and a tariff to achieve the desired outcome.
The key goal of a subsidy is to lower the price of the product for consumers while raising
the price received by producers. Traditional subsidies are typically financed by the government
through taxes. The subsidy effectively shifts the supply curve to the right, increasing supply and
lowering the price experienced by consumers. The producer then receives the price paid by
consumers plus the subsidy, resulting in a price that is higher than the previous free-market
equilibrium (Batlle, 2011). The gains by the consumer and the producer depend on the slope of
the supply and demand curves. Producers will tend to experience larger gains than consumers
due to relatively inelastic demand (seen as a steep demand curve). Energy is a necessity good,
meaning that changes in price will have little impact on demand in the short-term, the definition
of inelasticity. However, demand in the long-term may be more sensitive to price.
Several studies have been conducted to elicit the price elasticity of demand for electricity,
most concluding that it depends on the responsiveness of the utility company. A survey of
residential demand found price elasticities ranging from -1.25 to -2.57 (Lafferty, 2001). This
fairly wide range is the result of time-of-day considerations, with elasticity at its lowest during
peak demand hours. On the other hand, price elasticities found for commercial customers were
much tighter and more inelastic, ranging from 0 to -.47. This is intuitive, considering the fairly
consistent electrical needs of commercial buildings. Price elasticity depends strongly on the
responsiveness of utility companies. Utilities that use a fixed price tend to see more inelastic

	
  

45	
  

demand curves, while utilities that use dynamic pricing, such as hourly adjusting, experience
more elastic demand curves. Here in California, most utilities provide dynamic pricing options.
Although elasticity is still quite low, price changes should be kept within reason so as to avoid
significant changes in demand and to ensure renewable electricity producers are well supported.
This is especially important in the long run, as time allows consumers to substitute away from a
good if they experience significant price increases.
Although a subsidy undoubtedly benefits the receiving industry, it comes at a cost. The
gains by both producers and consumers come at the cost of government expenditures. This
number can be quite substantial depending on the size of the industry and how high the subsidy
must be to effectively protect it. The renewable energy sector is a relatively large sector and only
becoming more so. The subsidy necessary to protect renewable electricity, especially for solar
technology, will also be significant. In addition to the high gross cost of a subsidy, the costbenefit ratio is not 1:1. That is to say, the costs are not perfectly offset by the benefits. A subsidy
introduces a fair amount of deadweight loss, which refers to the difference between the total cost
and the combined market gains of producers and consumers (Eichner, Runkel, 2010).
Deadweight loss is almost unavoidable when market regulations are adopted, however they can
be a deciding factor in the adoption of a subsidy and must be properly considered.
In contrast to a subsidy, a tariff is aimed at reducing the competitiveness of a specific
industry, in this case the conventional electricity sector. Opposite of a subsidy, a successful tariff
increases the price paid by consumers while decreasing the price received by producers. The
difference of these two prices is equal to the size of the tax. These prices are the result of a
leftward shift of the supply curve, moving it upwards along the demand curve (Lesser, Su, 2007).
This time, again due to the elasticity of demand, the brunt of the tax burden will fall on
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consumers. Although demand is relatively inelastic, large price changes due to the tariff burden
will affect demand.
Instead of costing the government, a tariff increases revenue equal to the number of
products sold multiplied by the size of the tax. This would be a significant amount of money
considering the size of the conventional energy market. This added revenue could be used to
invest in renewable energy programs or in other government obligations. However, as with a
subsidy, a tariff still creates deadweight loss in the market. Politically, a tariff is difficult to gain
support, as it is more or less a tax. On the other hand, a traditional subsidy, although not a tax
itself, requires taxes for funding. Therefore, the issue lies in creating a policy that is as close to
budget-neutral as possible.

IV. The Feed-in Tariff: A Budget-Neutral Subsidy
A feed-in tariff is best viewed as a combination of a subsidy and a tariff, in the sense that
the subsidy is financed by the competitive industry instead of the government. In a feed-in tariff
system, utilities are required by law to enter purchase agreements with renewable electricity
generators. A feed-in tariff causes the supply of renewable electricity to shift right, just as a
subsidy would, while at the same time causing a leftward shift in supply of conventional
electricity, like a tariff (Rio, 2011). In theory, a feed-in tariff not only fosters technological
development but also mitigates the risks associated with investing in the renewable sector. An
ideal feed-in tariff also has a natural exit strategy, phasing out as the new technology becomes
more competitive with conventional technology. Lastly, the utility companies bear the extra cost
associated with renewable electricity production, effectively internalizing their negative
externalities and financing the tariff without government funding.
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Mitigating Risk
In theory, a feed-in tariff effectively addresses the risks inherent in the renewable energy
market described in Chapter 2, those being price, volume, and load balancing. Price is perhaps
the most important risk factor to mitigate, as it has the most significant market implications.
Feed-in tariffs employ long-term contracts, typically 20 years, which promise minimum per
KWh payments to renewable electricity generators. These payments adjust annually according to
predetermined degression rates. Price degression works within contracts as well as across
contracts over time. Within a specific contract, the renewable energy producer agrees to a fixed,
annual degression rate8 over the life of the contract. This rate is usually designed to maintain a 45% return of investment each year. Across contracts, the starting tariff price is lower for newer
contracts, as they presumably have access to technology that is better and more efficient than
technology employed by earlier contracts. (Shrimali, Baker, 2012). Both the longevity of the
contract and the fixed degression rates provide stability for prospective investors, allowing them
to calculate precisely how much energy a project must produce in order to experience a profit.
Secondly, feed-in tariffs do away with most all the risk concerning volume. Along with
guaranteed pricing, feed-in tariff contracts also ensure that generators are compensated for any
amount of electricity they wish to sell. Renewable electricity generators can enter contracts that
stipulate the complete purchase of all energy produced by the installation. On the other hand,
generators can also choose to sell only the surplus in electricity after their own power needs have
been met. In the event of underperformance by a renewable electricity generator, a feed-in tariff
can impose a penalty, allowing utilities to purchase renewable electricity elsewhere in order to
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
8	
  Fixed digression rates are typically based on technological development forecasts and demand forecasts based on conventional electricity.
Although fixed rates do mitigate risk for those entering contracts, they do run the risk of being incorrect due to poor forecasting or unforeseen
circumstances in the market. If the degression rate turns out to be too low, the renewable energy producer reaps the benefit and vice versa.

	
  

48	
  

meet their renewable portfolio standards (California Energy Commission, 2010). These contracts
provide certainty for both the renewable electricity producer and the utility company.
Lastly, feed-in tariffs can eliminate the risk of load imbalances for investors altogether by
placing the load-shaping burden on the utility. Although this presents a challenge for the utility
company, conventional wisdom asserts that the more capable of the two parties should bear the
responsibility. In this case, the utility has the physical and analytical wherewithal to address
load-balancing issues, whereas the individual renewable electricity producer does not. That being
said, a tariff may employ a price schedule that reflects trends in daily demand, i.e. paying higher
tariff prices for electricity generated during hours of peak demand (Couture, Cory, Kreycik,
Williams, 2010). This somewhat protects the utility companies by incentivizing generators to
development technology that will increase the load-following ability of renewable electricity.
Technology Development and Exit Strategy
Feed-in tariffs offer the flexibility necessary to assist all types of technological
development. Contracts can be tailored to any type of renewable energy, ensuring the long-term
development of technologies across the board. This is particularly effective in states and
countries that have a wide variety of renewable sources available. The pricing mechanism
necessary to foster growth across technologies can be complex, as the construction and
productions costs differ greatly among sources. However, source diversity is a valuable portfolio
characteristic and will only become more so in the future. Therefore, it would be irresponsible to
allow technological growth to stagnate for any particular source.
Feed-in tariffs naturally encourage technological development before phasing out
completely as competitiveness is achieved. This is another outcome of the fixed degression rates
included in the contracts. As the feed-in tariff degresses, generators have the incentive to
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increase efficiency (Lesser, Su, 2007). As described in Chapter 2, renewable energy technology
will begin to benefit from productivity gains stemming from learning-by-doing and economies of
scale. Degression rates promote these productivity gains while also protecting utilities from
overpaying for tariffs. The idea is that, in the long run, tariff prices will regress to zero just as
renewable energy technology becomes competitive with conventional technology.
Financing and Other Political Advantages
Ideally, the price of purchasing a cap and trade certificate to offset emissions is equal to
or greater than the price of the feed-in tariff, causing the utility companies to finance the full cost
of the tariff. For example, if the price for an emissions certificate is $100 and the cost of
offsetting the same amount of emissions by employing renewable energy is a certain fraction of
that, the choice is an easy one. If the costs for these two abatement strategies are equal, the utility
company may certainly choose to simply purchase certificates out of convenience. Therefore, it
is imperative that the feed-in tariff is promoted in other ways, such as limiting the use of
certificates or decreasing the supply of certificates overall, effectively raising the cost of that
abatement strategy.
Aside from the economics, which seem advantageous in theory, a feed-in tariff system
has several key characteristics that make it feasible from a policy perspective. First, a feed-in
tariff establishes a uniform system across all utilities within a country or state. The tariff is
mandated by law, demanding that utilities use the same criteria when considering contract
proposals from independent generators (Butler, Neuhoff, 2008). At the same time, a feed-in tariff
can be designed with certain flexibilities that protect utilities. For instance, utilities may not be
obligated to honor all contract proposals. Instead, utilities can work towards their renewable
capacity goals by selecting the most competitive independent systems. This not only maintains
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some level of competitiveness for conventional utilities but also encourages renewable electricity
generators to be as cost-effective as possible. Also, in an ideal world, a feed-in tariff represents a
budget neutral approach to renewable energy promotion. This is an extremely beneficial
characteristic from a political standpoint, considering about half of the United States’ population
prefers that the government stays out of the free market and reduces spending overall.
Unfortunately, economic and behavioral theory does not necessarily parallel real world
causes and effects. Ideally, successful feed-in policy would address all of the issues outlined
above, however the sheer scale and variety of some challenges will make this nearly impossible.
Therefore, it is important to examine the various characteristics of feed-in tariffs as they exist in
the real world and compare them to those of other policy options. Many countries around the
world have deployed feed-in tariffs and we can look at the characteristics of California’s own
policy, which is in its early stages.
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Chapter 4: The Feed-In Tariff and Other Policies in the Real World

I. Alternative Renewable Electricity Policies
AB32 provides the necessary framework and goals necessary for reducing California
emissions over the coming decades, including the valuation of greenhouse gas emissions and the
internalization of their associated costs using the cap and trade system. AB32 does not however,
provide any programs specifically aimed at encouraging renewable energy production. Current
programs that are designed to encourage greater energy efficiency and the development of
renewable sources, in addition to the feed-in tariff, include the New Solar Homes Partnership
(NSHP), the California Solar Initiative (CSI), property tax exclusions, and Property Assessed
Clean Energy (PACE) financing. Each of these programs is designed to target different projects
based on size, cost, technology, efficiency, and output. Most programs target the initial cost of
installing renewable electricity systems, while others target the production of electricity over
time. Most of these programs are relatively new and still require a great deal of analysis,
however they certainly represent a step in the right direction for renewable electricity generation
and lower emissions in the future.
Most renewable electricity policies target the cost of the initial construction. This is due
to a large disparity between construction costs and production costs between conventional and
renewable electricity producers. Traditional electricity sources are characterized by low
construction costs and relatively high production costs. That is to say, it is fairly cheap to build a
coal power plant relative to the actual production of electricity. On the other hand, renewable
sources are characterized by high construction costs and very low generation costs (EWEA,
2005). If government programs could incentivize small businesses and households to invest in
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renewable energy systems by assisting with construction costs, the cost-efficiency and general
deployment of renewable source electricity could increase considerably.
Programs underneath the California Solar Initiative, including the New Solar Homes
Partnership and some property tax exclusions, aim to reduce the initial construction cost burden
experienced by solar self-generation systems. Current PV systems cost approximately $6.75 per
watt, with the majority of that figure being labor and installation costs. The New Solar Homes
Partnership provides rebates of $2-2.90/watt depending on the type of project and technology.
The higher rebates are reserved for projects involving affordable and government housing
projects, while the lower rebates assist general residential and commercial projects. The NSHP
also takes into consideration the efficiency of each building type, requiring compliance of 15%
better and 30% better than current Building Energy Efficiency Standards depending on the rebate
value (Nasim, Nguyen, 2012).
One major limitation of the California Solar Initiative is that consumers must be
customers of one of three investor-owned utilities (IOUs), those being Pacific Gas and Electric,
Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric. Although these three IOUs service
the majority of Californians, accounting for approximately 70%, there is still a very large
population of Californians that are serviced by municipal utilities, leaving them unable to apply
for CSI rebates. Many municipal utilities offer similar assistance programs, however this lack of
universal policy may present challenges in the future as utilities change their electricity portfolio
mixes.
Similar to the NSHP, California property tax exclusions and PACE financing are in place
for commercial, industrial, and residential solar systems. Initial owners and owners installing
new systems can exclude 100% of the system value from their property value, substantially
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lowering property taxes depending on the size of the system. Also, unlike CSI programs, tax
exclusions can be claimed by any electricity consumers, not just those serviced by IOUs. For
those who are looking to build a new PV system, PACE financing provides flexible loan options
with low interest rates. Local governments offer bonds to investors and then use the capital to
loan to consumers. Consumers pay back the loan via a slight increase in property taxes over an
assigned term, with initial investors collecting the interest rate. This loan financing allows
consumers to diffuse the initial cost of a PV project over many years (typically 15-20), greatly
improving the economic viability of such projects.
As construction and installation costs for renewable self-generation systems decline, the
impact of construction-based subsidy programs such as the California Solar Initiative will also
become less significant. It is inevitable that PV technology, as well as renewable technology in
general, will become more affordable in the coming decades. Thus, California must look to
create policies that aim to encourage the long-term generation of renewably sourced electricity.
Feed-in tariffs, when designed correctly, provide valuable long-term assistance to generators,
fostering a responsible transition to renewable electricity.

II. The Feed-In Tariff: Real World Design and Application
Feed-in tariffs have been employed in the renewable energy sector in countries around
the world for decades. In the European Union alone, over 15,000MW of photovoltaic electricity
have been generated between 2000 and 2009 as a result of feed-in tariffs. On a global scale, over
75% of electricity generated from photovoltaic systems can be attributed to the encouragement
of feed-in tariffs (Frondel, Ritter, 2010). A feed-in tariff’s most significant advantage is its
flexibility. Tariffs can be used to target a variety of technologies and can utilize many different
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pricing strategies, all of which come at little cost to federal or state governments. Feed-in tariffs
also create several positive externalities in addition to the proliferation of renewable energy
production including job growth, load balancing, increased exports, and reduced GHG emissions.
The first feed-in tariff was implemented in Germany in December of 1990. As part of the
Electricity Feed-in Law, utilities were required to buy electricity from non-utility, renewable
energy generators. Price per KWh represented a certain premium above the retail electricity price.
This premium was determined by the cost-of-generation associated with each technology and
included distinct degression rates based on technological development forecasts for each source
(Fulton and Capalino, 2012). Germany’s feed-in law also employs an acceptable capacity
“corridor” to protect against renewable electricity flooding the market and causing significant
market failures (Fulton, Mellquist, Rickerson, Jacobs, 2011). Denmark and Spain soon followed
suit and enacted their own feed-in tariff policies, closely modeled after Germany’s. Since then,
countries around the world, including China and the United States, have enacted their own
versions of feed-in tariffs, tailoring the policy to fit their renewable energy goals.
Feed-in tariffs can be tailored to fit almost any scenario by adjusting the eligibility
standards and pricing methods. First, tariffs can target any type of generation technology, from
photovoltaic to small hydro and wind systems. This is an important advantage, as it allows
developers to focus on a wide range of technologies while receiving the same chance to
experience returns on their investment. This also plays an important role in tariff pricing
strategies, which will be discussed in detail shortly. Secondly, tariffs may utilize different caps.
Tariff caps can be based on individual installation capacities, program-wide capacity, total
program cost, or a combination of all three. Lastly, eligibility can be limited to certain investor or
owner types depending on the market demographics of the utility area.
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Pricing is the most flexible aspect of feed-in tariffs and represent the most important

decision when creating policy. Current feed-in tariffs utilize four distinct pricing strategies: fixed
price, cost of generation, value to the system, and auction-based. Fixed price tariffs guarantee the
generator a certain premium above the retail price of electricity. The fixed price strategy is
constant across technology types. Vice versa, pricing based on the cost of generation is
determined by the actual cost of the renewable technology (Mendonca, Corre, 2008). This
pricing scheme results in premiums very similar to fixed prices but allows for more flexibility in
choosing the type of technology. This is particularly effective in locations that might have two or
more renewable energy sources.
Pricing based on value to the system represents the most progressive pricing method.
Unlike fixed pricing and cost of generation pricing, which concern the paper costs of
conventional and renewable generation, value to the system takes into account the positive
externalities associated with renewable electricity production as well as time-of-delivery
consideration. Prices would reflect the lower emissions of the renewable source as well as
account for the avoidance of fossil fuels depending on the utility’s portfolio mix. Electricity
would also be priced according to the time of delivery, providing higher payments for electricity
generated during times of peak demand. Along with being the most progressive pricing strategy,
value to the system presents a difficult price degression challenge. On one hand, the tariff should
be responsive to changing values in the market over the length of the contract. On the other, the
tariff still needs to provide price and volume certainty to investors entering contracts. This
dilemma must be addressed.
Lastly, some feed-in tariffs have adopted an auction-based pricing mechanism. Auctions
allow utilities to choose tariff applicants based on their estimated cost per KWh generated. After
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meeting the initial eligibility requirements, generators compete with each other by offering to
accept the lowest tariff amounts. This allows generators to still realize a profit while minimizing
cost to the utility company. Auction-based pricing allows for swift reactions to changes in input
costs faced by renewable electricity generators. For example, if the price of photovoltaic panels
decreases due to advances in silicon technologies, generators would become more competitive
and drive down the price of the tariff during the auction. Under a fixed price system, this reaction
could not occur and utilities would be forced to pay for higher profit margins.
In addition to the initial pricing strategy, there are also several ancillary design features
that consider the cost of generation over the length of the contract and adjust the tariff price
accordingly. Price degression strategies encourage generators to continue to pursue cost saving
measures over the life of the contract, such as improving technology and efficiency. Tariffs can
utilize pre-established price degression rates or rates that adjust every year or two depending on
market characteristics and technological advancement.
Under the first strategy, considerations may include adjustments for inflation, front-end
loading, and time of delivery considerations. The first protects the real value of renewable energy
projects by following the Consumer Price Index. The second offers higher initial tariffs to assist
in construction financing, followed by lower long-term rates. And lastly, time of delivery pricing
provides different tariff rates depending on daily and seasonal electricity demand trends. Under
the second strategy, degression rates may also hinge on changes in the electricity sector over
time. This degression method introduces some added risk to tariff contracts, as changes in the
market may diverge from forecasts or investor expectation. Deciding on a pricing strategy is the
most important part of establishing a feed-in tariff system.
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III. A Case Study: Feed-in Tariffs in Germany
Having bought heavily into the Kyoto Protocol, Germany and the rest of the European
Union have prioritized responsible environmental policy much higher than the United States in
recent years. Similar to California, Germany has set a renewable energy generation goal of 35%
of production by 2020. German policymakers have certainly embraced the challenge of reducing
emissions and improving energy security through a variety of different strategies. Most
importantly, Germans have taken an environmental approach that works closely with leading
industries instead of against them, taking care to allow proper time for adaptation before
tightening standards and increasing regulation. Among other policies, the German feed-in tariff
system is often lauded as the most progressive in the world. However, economists disagree as to
whether or not the system, in its current form, truly represents the most cost-effect path to
renewable energy growth.
Germany’s initial feed-in tariff was based on a fixed percentage of the retail electricity
price, later transitioning to a cost-of-generation pricing method. At first, the tariff was based on a
given premium above the retail rate and was blind to technological differences for renewable
sources (Ragwitz and Huber, 2005). The policy protected utilities by enacting a cap for fed-in
renewable electricity at 5% of total generation. However, geographical and technological
differences soon created pricing and volume issues. Utilities in northern Germany became
inundated by feed-in tariffs coming from wind turbines located in the area, making them less
competitive than utilities in the south that experienced fewer tariff applicants. To combat this
trend, the tariff system was amended to utilize a cost-of-generation pricing strategy with 20-year
contracts and fixed degression rates. In this system, tariff prices are based on the cost of
generation of using a specific type of technology. The rate of degression is then calculated based
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on the empirically derived progress ratios of each technology, subsequently encouraging
manufacturers to continue to pursue increased efficiency measures and other cost-saving
developments (Mitchella, Bauknecht, 2006).
Current tariff prices for photovoltaic generation in Germany range from 21.11 Euro cents
to 28.74 cents/KWh depending on the size of the system (See Figure 6). The larger the system,
the smaller the tariff due to the benefits associated with economies of scale. In comparison, tariff
prices for hydro, onshore wind, and biomass average approximately 6.6 cents/KWh, 7.4
cents/KWh, and 10.9 cents/KWh, respectively (Fulton and Capalino, 2012). This large price
difference across technologies exemplifies the cost-of-generation pricing employed by the
current feed-in system. Degression rates for PV are based on capacity in order to prevent any
major market failures. If the cost of PV falls and capacity increases dramatically, the tariff
declines, protecting utilities from having to overpay for fed-in renewable electricity. This in turn,
protects electricity consumers from experiencing a spike in electricity prices.
Market Effects
In theory, Germany’s feed-in policy seems sound, but experts argue whether or not the
results are significant and therefore cost-effective. Supporters of the feed-in system point to its
stability, job creation, low transaction costs, and cost-of-generation benefits. From an investment
perspective, the German feed-in tariff creates a stable environment that minimizes risk and
volatility. The cost-of-generation strategy nature allows investors to see exactly where the price
of the tariff is going for each technology over the next 20 years. Future prices are usually a
significant unknown in investment markets and a large factor in risk. Experts calculate that the
German feed-in system has led to the creation of 180,000 jobs between 2004 and 2009, bringing
the renewable energy sector to a total of 340,000. Of these, an estimated 65,000 jobs were
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created in the PV industry alone (Frondel et al, 2010). Supporters claim that these trends are
bound to continue, but even the job creation statistics presented here should be taken with a grain
of salt, as explained below.
The German feed-in tariff system enjoys other cost-of-generation benefits, including very
low transaction costs. Transaction costs are inherently low, as the system does not require
expensive selection methods, preparation procedures, or infrastructural requirements outside of
the already established power grid. Eligibility requirements are fairly straightforward and the
contracting process is relatively painless. Some German’s who have successfully entered feed-in
tariff contracts claim that the entire process, from the first phone call to the actual grid
connection, took a matter of days. Not only do low transaction costs make the initial transition
more convenient, they also give investors the opportunity to be in complete control of the
profitability of the project. Since transaction costs are low and completely transparent, investors
can focus their efforts on analyzing variable costs on their side. Other benefits from this price
scheme come in the form of stability on the consumer side. Consumers, like investors, benefit
from the foresight provided by 20-year contracts.
Critics of the German feed-in tariff do not deny that the system encourages growth in the
renewable energy sector; their argument is based on cost efficiency. Opponents point specifically
to the tariff’s affect on retail prices and job loss in other industries. In late 2011, actual capacity
of new PV systems taking advantage of the tariff was more than double the projected amount—
approximately 7,400MW versus the predicted 3,500 (Frondel et al, 2010). Although the tariff is
based on capacity, it does not react quickly enough to significant spikes such as this. This lag
leads to upward pressure on electricity prices in the short-term as utilities are forced to raise
prices to cover the cost of paying the tariff. This price increase has been named the EEG
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surcharge, and represents the difference between the feed-in tariff price and the price of energy
on the energy exchange.
With the addition of the EEG surcharge for electricity consumers, retail prices in
Germany have increased by approximately 20% over the last half decade (See Figure 7).
However, the increase cannot be solely attributed to the EEG and the feed-in tariff. Economists
point to two other factors that could be just as, if not more, responsible for the increase in prices.
First, as part of their environmental campaign, Germany took nearly half (8 of 17) of their
nuclear power plants offline over the past several years. As recent as 2005, Germany relied on
nuclear power for over 25% of their electricity needs. Shutting down half of their nuclear plants
would certainly cause a shift in supply and an upward swing in prices, although no formal
studies have been conducted. Germany plans to take the remainder of their nuclear plants offline
by 2022, a transition that could have noticeable price implications. Secondly, over the same fiveyear period, German utilities have increased their profit margin from 1.1% to 8.2% (Gille and
Morris, 2012). This is a massive increase and most certainly had a positive effect on retail prices.
All things considered, more analysis must be done to conclude the exact source of electricity
price increases.
Job creation is also a contested issue between supporters and opponents. Although there
is no doubt that a boost in renewable energy demand will spark job growth within supporting
sectors, the question remains as to whether or not job loss in other industries eclipses the positive
growth. The rising cost of electricity due to the proliferation of renewable energy, whether
directly impacted by the feed-in tariff or not, significantly raises costs for energy intensive
industries. In the European Union, where labor and capital are relatively mobile, firms that are
hit hardest by increasing electricity prices can move to countries with lower energy costs. The
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alternative to migration is reducing wages to offset the rising costs, another tactic that results in
lower economic output. Again however, these effects are hard to blame distinctly on the feed-in
tariff and require further study. In reality, it is probably impossible to identify for certain which
jobs are created and which jobs are destroyed as a result of a policy as specific as a feed-in tariff.
Lastly, the effectiveness of renewable energy at reducing emissions is undeniable, yet
critics of the feed-in approach again cite its costs. The European Union currently utilizes an
Emissions Trading System, in which Germany participates. This cap and trade system demands
firms to purchase credits to cover their emissions, creating the incentive for firms to reduce their
emissions in order to reduce their credit payments. However, efficient technology has outpaced
the reduction of certificate supply, causing certificate prices to plummeted in Germany and the
rest of the EU (Faber et al, 2012). Credits bought under the ETS are currently priced at 8
Euros/ton of greenhouse gases and are expected to continue to decrease if the available credit
pool is not reduced substantially. In comparison, the abatement cost for a ton of carbon under the
current feed-in scheme is considerably higher. If one simply took the total cost of the feed-in
program and divided it by the emissions reductions, the result could be as high as 716	
  €/ton
(Frondel et al, 2009). However, this number is somewhat misleading considering that the costs
of the feed-in tariff cover a variety of positive externalities, particularly the long-term
development of renewable technology.

IV. California’s Current Feed-in Tariff Policy
California is one of only four states in the U.S. that has enacted statewide feed-in tariffs
in one form or another, joining Hawaii, Vermont, and Maine. Of these four states, California is
the only one whose tariff is based on time-of-delivery considerations rather than cost-of-
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generation. That is to say, tariff prices for all technology types are based on when the electricity
enters the grid, providing higher tariff prices for electricity produced during peak hours.
California’s feed-in tariff utilizes a variety of implementation and pricing strategies, setting it
apart from the German system analyzed above.
The California feed-in tariff, like the German system, represents a budget neutral option
for increasing renewable energy growth. Utility companies are on the hook to pick up the tab for
two reasons. First, AB32 has enacted strict renewable portfolio standards over the coming years,
with the first major goal of 33% production by 2020. If utilities companies fail to meet the RPS,
they may be subject to fines and other penalties. These penalties are typically higher than the
costs associated with paying a feed-in tariff, so it is in the utilities’ best interest to utilize the
feed-in tariff system. Similarly, utility companies are also responsible for reducing their
emissions. By law, utilities may only use emissions certificates to offset 25% of their emissions.
Therefore, the remainder of emissions reductions must come from producing renewable energy.
Although the added cost of employing renewable energy will affect prices, the feed-in tariff
system will not require significant government spending.
Eligibility for California’s feed-in tariff relies on system capacity and location. The three
major investor-owned utilities have designated two capacity levels, systems under and over
3MW9. System owners can choose to enter full-buy or excess contracts (DeShazo, Matulka,
2010). The first concerns the sale of all energy produced by the system over the course of the
contract, while the second concerns the sale of surplus energy after then electricity needs of the
site have been met. Because larger generation systems benefit from economies of scale, the tariff

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
9	
  For comparison, a single-family home can be fully sustained by a 4KW system producing 5,400KWh/year.
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allotment is generally less. Utilities also value a system based on its location, offering a premium
for systems located in high demand areas.
California’s feed-in tariff is also unique, in that it works hand-in-hand with the state’s
Renewables Portfolio Standards (RPS) program. The state RPS system mandates that investorowned utilities must procure 33% of their energy from renewable sources by 2020. The current
capacity goal is 750 MW of renewable energy capacity and is divided up between the three
largest IOUs according to the size of their costumer base. Pacific Gas & Electric is responsible
for 218.8MW, Southern California Edison 226MW, and San Diego Gas & Electric 48.8MW.
These three utility companies currently average 20.1% production from renewables, up from just
13.8% in 2003. However, this rate of growth will have to increase in order to meet the 33% goal
in the next 7 years (Long, 2011).
California feed-in prices are based on time-of-delivery considerations and are frequently
amended based on a Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff (RE-MAT) or a Renewable Auction
Mechanism (RAM) depending on the size of the project. Current feed-in tariff prices range from
8.1¢/KWh to 9.7¢/KWh depending on the length of the contract (10-20 years). These rates are
considerably less than the tariff prices experienced in Germany. Initially, the California feed-in
system utilized a Market Price Referent (MPR). The MPR took into account the general
operating costs associated with a baseload natural gas plant as well as time-of-delivery for fed-in
renewable electricity. However, California has since moved to the RE-MAT pricing system. The
RE-MAT makes the same considerations as the MPR, including the time-of-delivery factors, but
is based on a bidding system.
The baseline of the RE-MAT is determined by weighting the highest executed contract
price achieved using the Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM), which is used to determine

	
  

64	
  

tariff pricing for projects over 3MW. These larger renewable energy projects came together in
late 2011 to bid for financing from the IOUs in the first RAM. In this auction, 13 renewable
electricity generation projects won contracts totaling 140 MW. The highest accepted proposal
was $89.23/MWh, or 8.9¢/KWh. Consequently, projects under 3MW start at this price level and
are then compensated with regard to the electricity’s time-of-delivery, resulting in the price range
mentioned above. Intuitively, electricity produced during off-peak hours receives a smaller tariff
than electricity produced during peak hours. If too few generators sign contracts at the initial
price, the RE-MAT slowly increases the tariff price until prospective renewable projects are able
to see profitable returns and consequently sign up.
Degression rates for the California feed-in tariff are based on market forecasts and
technological growth expectations. Just as any other feed-in tariff, the California degression rates
are designed to encourage technological advancement and improvement in efficiency. The
degression rates are fixed for any given contract and are independent of rates used in previous
contracts. Unlike the German degression rate, which adjusts annually according to activity within
the renewable energy sector (namely capacity), the California degression rate is predetermined,
adjusting annually based on forecasts calculated at the time of the initial contract signing. This
rather inflexible approach provides certainty for both utilities and renewable electricity
generators, but also may run into problems if initial forecasts are incorrect. If the degression rate
proves too steep, renewable energy projects could become economically unviable towards the
end of their contracts. Vice versa, if the degression rate is too flat, the utilities will end up paying
tariffs that are too high, hurting their competition.
Market Effects
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California’s feed-in tariff is in its early stages so market effects will only start to become

apparent in the coming years. However, comparing the California tariff to its German cousin, we
can make some assumption for it’s future effects. First, the smaller size of the California tariff
will likely keep capacity growth modest over the coming years. This more gradual adoption of
renewable electricity will have less affect on electricity price, barring other effects such as
economic growth or changes in utility profit margins. One downside is that the slower adoption
rate will have less immediate effect on the environment. This might pose a challenge with
concern to the California emissions goals over the coming decades, especially the 2050 goal of
80% below 1990 standards.
Secondly, the uniform pricing method used for the California tariff will favor one type of
technology in the long run. This is not necessarily a bad thing for a couple different reasons. First,
renewable sources in California are dominated by the potential of solar power. The current
development rates for solar technology are significantly steeper than development rates
associated with wind and other technologies. Therefore, it makes sense to invest in programs that
encourage solar energy, as each dollar spent results in a larger marginal gain in technological
advancement. Secondly, other renewable technologies are nearing competitiveness. For example,
tariff prices for large, onshore wind installations in Germany are only a few percentage points
higher than wholesale electricity prices. It seems that wind, and other technologies that are
nearing competitiveness, will reach maturity with little assistance.
Lastly, the California degression rates, although promoting certainty over the life of a
contract, may spell disaster in the event of a significant shock in the electricity sector. For
example, if yet another extraction method for fossil fuels is discovered, the subsequent reduction
in electricity prices will leave the tariff much too high. Utilities would have to pay a much higher

	
  

66	
  

percentage to continue to support renewable electricity production, making the feed-in tariff even
costlier in relative terms. Similarly, if the price of photovoltaic technology drops significantly
and unexpectedly, the utilities will be stuck paying for high profit margins for renewable
electricity generators, a far from efficient outcome.
These predictions should be taken with a grain of salt, as we won’t know the true market
effects of the tariff until they occur. However, uncertainty should not discourage policymakers
from determining which characteristics of the feed-in tariff are most valuable and applicable to
California. The following chapter will delve back into the policy criteria established in Chapter 3.
Both the German and the Californian feed-in tariff will be evaluated with respect to the criteria
before recommendations for effective improvements are made.
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Policy Recommendations

I. Criteria Analysis
Examining existing policies using consistent criteria is an effective technique in eliciting
the most significant differences between them. Because criteria are based on theoretical
framework and revolve around ideal policy characteristics and mechanisms, their application on
real world policies can reveal the major shortcomings of economic and political theory. This
section will evaluate the California feed-in tariff with respect to each criterion, while also
commenting on the benefits or disadvantages of the German tariff.
Effectiveness
The California feed-in system, at its root, is effective. Even in it’s early stages, California
has experienced a growth in renewable energy capacity that can be directly tied to the feed-in
tariff. That being said, growth has been fairly slow due to relatively low tariff rates and the fairly
complicated contract process. On one hand, the slow adoption rate can be viewed as responsible.
Utilities need time to adjust to a changing portfolio mix, especially changes that require such
vastly different technology. On the other hand, the slow adoption rate is burning valuable time in
the race against emissions. Germany’s adoption rate under the feed-in tariff was too effective,
flooding the market and wreaking havoc on retail prices. The appropriate level of effectiveness is
clearly in between the slower rate of California adoption and the faster German rate.
Cost Effective
Cost-effectiveness is difficult to evaluate, as feed-in tariffs result in many positive
externalities that are difficult to quantify. The largest unknown is the cost of damages associated
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with greenhouse gas emissions. Assuming higher cost figures, renewable energy promoted
through the feed-in system can be somewhat cost-effective. One key difference between the two
tariff policies is that a large portion of Germany’s budget is being spent on encouraging solar
power, which is not necessarily the county’s most abundant natural resource. In California, solar
power is clearly the abundant resource and is rightfully receiving the most attention. In the long
run, this may result in a renewable energy portfolio that is more cost-effective than Germany’s.
All things considered, it seems that emissions certificates through cap and trade systems
represent a more cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, we know that
increasing efficiency alone will not be enough to meet future emissions goals, and that renewable
technology must be promoted. Therefore, the lower cost-effectiveness of the feed-in tariff might
be a necessary evil.
Upfront vs. Long-Term Financial Assistance
This criterion is more a comparison between the feed-in tariff and current policies that
target construction costs, such as those underneath the California Solar Initiative. The feed-in
tariff is a good strategy for promoting medium to large-scale renewable installations. Because the
feed-in tariff does not provide upfront assistance, aside from a steeper tariff schedule option that
starts high and decreases quickly, the prospective renewable generator must have the funds
necessary to cover the initial construction costs. Having the level of liquidity necessary to
finance construction costs becomes less likely as the size of the installation decreases. Therefore,
programs such as the New Solar Homes Partnership and Property Assessed Clean Energy
financing cater much more effectively to small-scale installations that need assistance in the
short-term, rather than in the long-term. That being said, the feed-in tariff represents a valuable
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opportunity for larger projects that have the upfront funds but seek long-term returns on their
investment.
Mitigation of Risk and Uncertainty
Mitigating risk is yet another extremely important criterion for a prospective policy.
Investors consider risk more than anything else when making a decision to enter a market or not.
If the risk overshadows the possible rate of return on investment, investors will shy away and the
renewable energy sector will not acquire the capital necessary to boost capacity and develop
technology. The rate of return under the feed-in tariff system is typically small, ranging from 05% over 20 years, therefore the risk must also be relatively small. 20-year contracts and lockedin tariff rates do improve certainty in the long run, giving investors the foresight necessary to
conduct accurate cost-benefit analysis. However, it is the various degression mechanisms that
add risk over the life of the contract.
First, the German degression rates are based on capacity, yet do not respond quickly
enough to significant changes. This adds a significant amount of risk for utility companies.
Germany has already experienced one spike in renewable capacity that had serious implications
for the utility companies and the electricity market, raising prices by a significant amount. The
Californian degression rate is even more inflexible over the course of a given contract. Although
this provides certainty in the short-term, its inability to respond to market changes in the longterm could be an issue. The Germans have recently implemented a capacity “corridor,” making
sure that tariff and degression rates promote increases in capacity within a given band. This
could represent an effective solution, as long as changes in capacity can be identified quickly and
the tariff prices adjusted accordingly.
Market Efficiency
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The feed-in tariff, like any other government regulation imposed on a market, does create

some deadweight loss. To put it simply, the natural equilibrium at which the utility companies
would supply electricity would occur using a generation portfolio of mostly conventional sources,
as they have provided for decades. Thus, the forced introduction of higher-cost renewable
electricity by the feed-in tariff inherently decreases both consumer and producer surpluses, at
least in the short run. In the long run, the feed-in tariff ideally results in the full competitiveness
of renewable energy, signifying a return to equilibrium in the electricity sector. The main issue is
that the free market will not adopt renewable electricity fast enough to reach the emissions goals
set forth by AB32. So from an environmental perspective, particularly one that is savvy to the
economic and social costs of greenhouse gas emissions, the feed-in tariff is efficient.
In terms of transaction costs, which decrease efficiency of a program, the German and
Californian tariffs could not be more different. In Germany, information regarding eligibility and
contract processes is readily available and easy to understand. There are very few overhead costs
in the form of administrative or regulatory fees that inherently make the adoption process easy
and effective. In California however, information regarding the feed-in tariff and its various
eligibility requirements are very difficult to come by, and even harder to understand once
procured. This is a major detractor for possible investors who value time and convenience in
their decision-making. The transaction costs also get worse as the size of the renewable
installation increases, as permitting issues increase and legal council becomes almost a necessity.
By comparison, the efficiency of rebate programs such as the NSHP seems to be much
better than the feed-in tariff. However, this is perhaps an unfair comparison due to the relatively
small-scale of installations that take advantage of these upfront programs. Installations of this
sort are usually built on rooftops and other existing structures where construction is already
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permitted and access to necessary electrical infrastructure is good. Larger installations will
always have to jump through more regulatory hoops than smaller projects, but the California
system has a thing to learn from its streamlined German cousin.
Transparency
This criterion sees yet another significant difference between the German and Californian
feed-in tariffs. The German system, having far fewer administrative and regulatory issues, is
simpler, naturally causing it to be more transparent. The Californian feed-in tariff feels much
more bureaucratic, leaving prospective investors to sift through information on both government
websites and investor-owned utility websites. Transparency does not increase the monetary costeffectiveness, but it certainly caters to the individual’s preference of convenience, which has
serious implications for actual adoption. This phenomenon will be addressed in more detail in
the behavioral section below.
Market Conformity
We can see from the German system that the feed-in tariff does lead to market
conformity in the long run. Although PV technology is still highly subsidized through the tariff,
wind, hydro, and biomass are all approaching competitiveness in the greater electricity market.
Wind in particular has experienced great increases in competitiveness due to the feed-in tariff,
this is even more important considering its abundance throughout Germany. That being said, the
German tariff has been active for nearly two decades, alluding to a conformity process that is
slow and not without its challenges. Judging from the German experience, California is at least
two, if not three, decades away from making renewable electricity a fully competitive and mature
market. In the scheme of things, this transition is not all that slow, especially when being
compared to the length of transition that would occur without government regulation.
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Technological Advancement
Both the German and Californian feed-in tariff designs effectively promote the
advancement of renewable electricity technology. However, there are some key differences. The
German pricing scheme is based on cost-of-generation, providing equal support to all types of
technology with respect to their unique construction and operating costs. This across-the-board
assistance promotes advancement in all technologies rather than focusing on the source that
might have the most potential. This is where the Californian feed-in tariff might be at an
advantage. The Californian system promotes more efficient technological advancement through
specialization. Since solar energy has the most potential, California’s value-to-the-system pricing
strongly encourages the advancement of solar technology. Also, remembering the advantages of
distributed versus utility-scale renewable installations, the advancement of flexible, rooftop solar
technology bodes well for its competitiveness in the future. Specializing on advancing
technologies that concern California’s most abundant renewable source, while other states and
countries perfect the technologies associated with their abundant renewable sources, seems like
the most efficient way to get to worldwide renewable electricity competitiveness.
Technological advancement underneath the feed-in tariff, regardless of what source it
targets, is far superior to technological advancement under upfront rebate programs. Rebate
programs that assist small-scale installations hardly promote advancement at all, mostly because
household systems are generally a one-time investment and are primarily used to offset onsite
electricity needs. The incentive to increase efficiency or improve technology is simply not there,
as profit margins for small installations are slim to none. Small-scale generators also lack the
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financial and physical capabilities necessary to improve technology. In this regard, the feed-in
tariff is highly advantageous.

II. Behavioral Factors and Social Norms
Behavioral factors are by far the most overlooked issue in terms of environmental policy
design. Current environmental programs here in California, whether targeting emissions
reductions or promoting renewable electricity, do not properly address green consumer
preferences or environmental social norms. Over the past decade or so, the environmental
movement has gained significant ground, yet access to good information and marketing of green
products still remains weak. The principles of the feed-in tariff are economically sound, but they
fail to capture even the greenest of consumers due to the prevalence of negative and incorrect
perceptions concerning reliability, convenience, and price. The feed-in tariff, as well as all the
other renewable electricity programs, should be accompanied by aggressive marketing
campaigns that target all consumer demographics and stress the importance and relatively easy
process of adopting renewable electricity.
The two most widely held negative stereotypes concerning renewable electricity are that
it is more expensive and less reliable than conventional technology and that it is inconvenient to
adopt. Current policies, especially the feed-in tariff, do very little to combat these perceptions
and even bolster certain aspects of them. First, the average consumer does not understand the
economics behind subsidies and tariffs; they simply know that renewable technologies are more
expensive than conventional technology. Marketing campaigns do not necessarily have to
convey the inner-workings of a subsidy, but they should stress the bottom line, which is what the
majority of consumers use to make a purchasing decision. Using the feed-in tariff, generators
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receive ample compensation for producing renewable electricity, and in most cases even
experience a positive return on their investment. Therefore, the positive bottom line should be
enough for a good percentage of prospective adopters. For those consumers who do want to do
their own research, access to good information needs to be available. Although the feed-in tariff
is in its early stages, more studies need to be conducted and the causes and effects must be
explicitly presented. There are plenty of academic studies that concern feed-in tariffs around the
world, as evidenced by this paper, but interested consumers will be much more persuaded by
literature that focuses on possible causes and effects in their own backyard10.
Similarly, framing of the policy does not have to include why renewable electricity is just
as reliable as conventional energy, only that it is. After all, those who adopt renewable energy
using the feed-in tariff are still connected to the same grid and continue to receive the same
energy they did in the past. It is facts like these that need to be highlighted for consumers in
order to build appeal and encourage adoption. In terms of convenience, the current California
feed-in tariff shoots itself in the foot. Consumers perceive the transition as inconvenient because
the transition using the feed-in tariff is inconvenient. However, this is more an issue of the actual
mechanics of the policy, rather than an issue of behavioral factors.
Although many consumers hold the same negative perceptions towards renewable
electricity, the ways in which these perceptions can be altered differ greatly between various
consumer groups. Therefore, it is imperative that policies concerning renewable electricity
properly target different demographics in order to gain the mass appeal necessary to truly
encourage adoption. Targeting demographics is particularly important in a state like California,
where the consumer base is extremely diverse. Electricity consumers represent every race, socio	
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  This is a result of familiarity bias, or rather the tendency for individuals to have higher confidence levels in decisions that involve issues they
are familiar with. This familiarity can be a result of locational proximity to the issue as well as similarities in occupational knowledge or interests.
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economic class, cultural background, and occupational sector. One of the most damaging
stereotypes of the environmental movement is that it is for wealthy, Caucasian males. Marketing
for renewable electricity adoption must break down this stereotype by highlighting the
accessibility of programs to everyone.
The feed-in tariff certainly faces a unique set of challenges in terms of breaking down
perceptions and increasing appeal, mostly due to the type of generators that it targets. This paper
concluded that the feed-in tariff is most effective for medium and large-scale operations, i.e.
businesses and larger cooperatives rather than individual households. Although many of the
behavioral factors are framed in terms of individual consumers, a lot of them apply to businesses
as well. Like individuals, businesses are part of a much larger business community that
establishes and practices its own set of social norms. A policy will be successful if it can instill a
sense of environmental responsibility at this larger scale.
Environmental policies can positively frame renewable electricity and instill a sense of
environmental responsibility within business communities in two ways. First, the feed-in tariff
can be framed directly to the business community as the fiscally responsible thing to do. Unlike
the average individual, businesses are more likely to employ quantitative methods during the
decision-making process. Therefore, stressing the higher future cost of conventional electricity
can encourage a switch to renewable electricity now. Also, businesses generally consider longer
investment timelines than individuals do. So framing the feed-in tariff as a steady form of longterm revenue will certainly be appealing to most businesses that are concerned with fiscal
stability over the long run.
Second, marketing of the policy can influence businesses indirectly by encouraging the
customers of businesses to demand greener business practices. This strategy has the chance to be
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extremely effective. As addressed earlier, many consumers state that they are willing to pay a
premium for green products. However, when actually presented with the opportunity to go green,
they fail to adopt the product, often citing inconvenience as the deciding factor. In this case
however, the consumer does not bear the inconvenience of adopting renewable electricity. Even
if a business must raise its prices to cover the cost of going green, consumers that previously
stated they were willing to pay a green premium but didn’t will now be much more likely to
make the switch, simply because the inconvenience factor is no longer there.
While marketing for the feed-in tariff focuses on various business communities and their
customer bases, marketing for smaller-installation programs needs to focus on demographics of
the individual consumer. Programs such as the NSHP need to be framed as convenient, as the
participants will always be the ones that bear the transaction and opportunity costs associated
with the adoption process. Highlighting positive characteristics such as transparency and low
overhead costs certainly improve the perception of convenience. These programs also need to be
framed as accessible to all consumers, regardless of socio-economic status. The major point of
these programs is to assist consumers with the initial construction costs regardless of their
financial status. This should be at the forefront of any marketing campaign.
Policies concerning renewable electricity can be framed in ways that appeal to a wide
variety of possible adopters. These frames can be actual differences in the policy’s mechanisms
or simply rhetorical frames that appeal to different consumer behaviors. Just like marketing
campaigns for any competitive consumer product, renewable energy policy can seek to capture
the interest of people of different economic classes, ethnic groups, and cultural backgrounds.
This is not to insinuate any bending of facts, but rather the selection of different policy aspects to
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sell to different audiences. The population of California is diverse; therefore the methods to
attract renewable energy adopters must be as such.
Current advertisement for the feed-in tariff and other renewable electricity programs is
weak to nonexistent. Policies must consider the above behavioral factors and associated
marketing strategies and pursue them aggressively. At the same time, the claims made in framing
the programs must be true. This means improvements must be made to the adoption processes of
programs, especially for the feed-in tariff. Improvements should be aimed specifically at
reducing transaction costs and inconvenience in order to create a more streamlined process for
the adopter.

III. Recommendations for California
In addition to improving consumer awareness of renewable electricity programs,
California should make some minor changes to the actual mechanisms of the feed-in tariff. First,
renewable energy capacity underneath the feed-in tariff should be increased, while at the same
time ensuring that over-adoption does not occur. Secondly, the feed-in tariff should cooperate
more closely with the California emissions cap and trade system, so as to improve market
efficiency and ensure the internalization of negative environmental externalities. Lastly,
California must streamline the adoption process by increasing transparency and reducing
transaction costs.
The current adoption rate in California under the feed-in tariff is too slow, leading to a
renewable energy capacity increase that will struggle to meet the 2020 RPS goal. In order to
increase capacity, tariff rates should be slightly increased. The current tariff price in California is
less than 1/3rd the PV tariff price offered in Germany. Raising the tariff by just a few cents
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should have a positive effect on capacity that is larger than the negative effect on consumers in
the form of higher retail prices. This should of course be the focus of intense economic analysis,
but judging by Germany’s success using much higher rates, a slight increase in California tariff
rates should not cause significant market effects. In conjunction with raising rates, California
should also adopt a capacity “corridor” similar to Germany’s in order to prevent over-adoption.
As mentioned throughout this paper, the lack of distinct pricing of greenhouse gas
emissions causes internalization of the associated environmental and social costs to be
incomplete. As in Europe, certificate prices in the cap and trade system have proven to be
unexpectedly low. This does not point to the failure of the system, but rather to the fact that
reducing greenhouse gas emissions has been cheaper than expected. Therefore, reduction
expectations under the cap and trade system should be drastically increased to better mirror the
true damages caused by emissions. Firms will continue to pay for certificates until it is cheaper
to employ other emissions reduction strategies, i.e. switching to renewable electricity. These
larger firms represent ideal candidates for installing renewable electricity technology using the
feed-in tariff.
One of the largest issues associated with the current feed-in tariff system is that it is
confusing. Finding information on eligibility standards and contract procedures is nearly
impossible and extremely time consuming. On top of that, the actual contract process requires a
great deal of paperwork and does not result in a grid connection or tariff payments until months
later. Making the process more user-friendly would reduce administrative costs and get contracts
on the grid more quickly, while also making the feed-in more appealing to other prospective
adopters. In addition, better communication between the government and the investor-owned
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utilities would improve the responsiveness of tariff prices for new contracts, once again ensuring
that the renewable energy capacity does not increase too quickly.
It should be noted that these recommendations are mostly based on comparisons to the
German feed-in tariff experience. Although the two feed-in tariffs are somewhat similar, the
market responses could be vastly different due to differences in renewable source availability,
electricity market infrastructure, consumer preferences, etc. It should also be noted that the
California feed-in tariff is still in its early stages. All these considerations point to the fact that
further studies need to be conducted, and that in the meantime, the policy should be given a
chance as it stands. However, if renewable electricity does begin to fall behind its expected
capacity goals, these policy recommendations may very well be the correct responses.

IV. Conclusion
The feed-in tariff is a flexible, yet effective mechanism in promoting the proliferation of
renewable electricity in California. The tariff creates a stable investment environment that
protects both the utilities and the renewable electricity generators. Not only does the system
foster capacity growth, but also technological advancement to the point where renewable
electricity can compete in the market without assistance. From an environmental standpoint, the
feed-in tariff contributes significantly towards achieving the emissions reduction goals set forth
by AB32 without causing harmful increases to electricity prices.
The feed-in tariff model has been used in countries all over the world and in countless
variations. The California model is certainly unique, using a dynamic combination of eligibility
requirements, pricing mechanisms, and degression rates. Flaws can already be spotted in the
system, but it is too early to tell what type of market effects will truly prevail. The key will be to
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analyze the market effects as they happen and adjust the tariff accordingly. In the meantime, it
would be advantageous to pursue more aggressive green marketing campaigns in order to
establish meaningful social norms in favor of environmentally responsible goods and practices.
These strong social norms will help to ensure quicker and more effective transitions to green
products in the future, including the complete transition to renewable electricity over the coming
generations.
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Appendix

Figure	
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  State	
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  by	
  Source	
  

Figure	
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  Greenhouse	
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  Emissions	
  by	
  Source	
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Figure	
  3:	
  Emissions	
  Reduction	
  Goals	
  (Long,	
  2011)	
  

Figure	
  4:	
  Total	
  Cost	
  of	
  Electricity	
  Production	
  per	
  KWh	
  (Frondel	
  et	
  al,	
  2012)	
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Figure	
  5:	
  Cost	
  Curves	
  by	
  Renewable	
  Technology	
  (Think	
  Progress,	
  2011)	
  
	
  http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/05/26/208184/ge-‐solar-‐cheaper-‐than-‐fossil-‐fuels-‐in-‐5-‐years/	
  

Figure	
  6:	
  German	
  Feed-‐In	
  Tariff	
  Prices	
  and	
  Capacity	
  Gains	
  (Fulton	
  and	
  Capalino,	
  2012)	
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Figure	
  7:	
  German	
  Electricity	
  Prices	
  as	
  a	
  %	
  of	
  2005	
  Prices	
  (Clean	
  Technica,	
  2012).	
  

http://cleantechnica.com/2012/09/03/german-‐electricity-‐prices-‐rise-‐as-‐utilities-‐increase-‐their-‐profit-‐
margin-‐from-‐1-‐1-‐to-‐8-‐2/	
  
	
  

*Note:	
  The	
  three	
  gradual	
  lines	
  represent	
  the	
  retail	
  prices	
  in	
  the	
  Residential,	
  
Commercial,	
  and	
  Industrial	
  sectors.	
  The	
  more	
  volatile	
  line	
  is	
  the	
  wholesale	
  price	
  of	
  
electricity	
  as	
  paid	
  on	
  the	
  Electricity	
  Exchange.	
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